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PAKISTAN’S FAILED COMMITMENT: HOW
PAKISTAN’S INSTITUTIONALIZED PERSECUTION
OF THE AHMADIYYA MUSLIM COMMUNITY
VIOLATES THE INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON
CIVIL AND POLITICAL RIGHTS
By Qasim Rashid1
“My guiding principle will be justice and complete impartiality, and I
am sure that with your support and cooperation, I can look forward
to Pakistan becoming one of the greatest Nations of the world.”
– Muhammad Ali Jinnah,2* Pakistan’s Founder and First Governor
General at the Presidential Address to the Constituent
Assembly of Pakistan on 11th August, 1947.
ABSTRACT:
The United Nations (“UN”) adopted the International Cove-
nant on Civil and Political Rights (“ICCPR”) in 1966 and officially im-
plemented it in 1976 to ensure, among other guarantees, that no
1 The author is an American-Muslim human rights activist, writer, and lecturer
on American-Islamic issues. He received his Bachelors of Science in Marketing
from the University of Illinois at Chicago (2006) and is completing his Juris Doc-
torate from the University of Richmond School of Law (2012), where he serves as
Executive Editor of the Richmond Journal of Global Law and Business and
Founder and President of the Muslim Law Student Association. He can be reached
at q.rashid@richmond.edu. The author also expresses his sincere gratitude to his
father, Rashid Yahya, wife, Ayesha Noor, colleague, Amjad Mahmood Khan, the
Richmond Law Faculty, and the Richmond Journal of Global Law and Business.
Each provided generous help, support, and insight on the various issues addressed
in this paper. Without each of their involvement, this paper would not have been
possible.
2 Akbar S. Ahmed, Jefferson and Jinnah: Humanist Ideals and the Mythodology of
Nation-Building, in THE FUTURE OF LIBERAL DEMOCRACY: THOMAS JEFFERSON AND
THE CONTEMPORARY WORLD 85, 91 (Rouhollah K. Ramazini & Robert Fatton eds.,
2004).
* This paper is dedicated to Pakistan’s visionary Founder and first Governor-
General, Muhammad Ali Jinnah (1876-1948), who fought valiantly for a nation
founded on the tenets of freedom, equality, and pluralism. Under his revolutionary
leadership, millions of individuals of all backgrounds were granted the opportu-
nity to live in a liberated nation, free from the shackles of oppression. Let this
paper serve as a reminder that Muhammad Ali Jinnah’s vision of a free nation,
though obscured behind the veil of extremism, is still possible, should Pakistanis
and the world at large wish it to be.
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human is denied his or her right to equal voting, freedom of political
association, due process of law, freedom of life, freedom of religion,
freedom of speech, and freedom of assembly. The Islamic Republic of
Pakistan is among 166 nations that have signed and ratified the
ICCPR. Since signing the ICCPR in 2008 and ratifying it in 2010, how-
ever, Pakistan has perpetuated state-sanctioned and violent persecu-
tion of religious minority groups such as Ahmadi Muslims, Christians,
and Hindus, through anti-blasphemy legislation and voting disen-
franchisement. This article examines the plight of Pakistan’s religious
minorities, focusing primarily on the Ahmadiyya Muslim Community,
in the context of the ICCPR. It demonstrates that Pakistan’s Ahmadi
Muslims are robbed of basic human rights in violation of the ICCPR
and the imminent threats such violations pose to the international
community. It concludes with an analysis of the practical steps the in-
ternational community should take to remedy these threats, methods
to revive religious freedom in Pakistan, and better ensure national and
international security.
PART I: INTRODUCTION
Pakistan’s ICCPR violations and state-sanctioned persecution
of religious minorities have created a breeding ground for extremism.
It should be no surprise, therefore, that Bruce Riedel of the Brookings
Institution described Pakistan as “probably the most dangerous coun-
try in the world” today.3  This phenomenon directly impacts the
United States and the international community at large because it cre-
ates an environment to develop and export extremism.  The United
States and United Nations must work together to recognize the plight
of millions of Pakistani citizens who belong to a religious minority, and
work to afford them the basic ICCPR-guaranteed freedoms they de-
serve.  Silence in the face of Pakistan’s clear violations of international
law will only strengthen extremist ideologies within the country and
abroad.  Pakistan’s current state of affairs pertaining to human rights
is dismal. With a proper understanding of the gravity of the situation
and a unified international effort, however, Pakistan can be held ac-
countable to full ICCPR compliance.
Part II of this paper provides context into Pakistan’s origin as a
paragon of religious freedom founded in the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights (“UDHR”), as well as a thorough analysis of the ICCPR.
Part III describes Pakistan’s gradual transition to the quasi-theocracy
it has become today.  Part IV details Pakistan’s current discriminatory
laws, the resulting human rights violations, and the consequential na-
3 Interview by Scott Simon with Bruce Riedel, Brookings Institute, Assassination
Leaves Pakistan Security Shaken (Jan. 15, 2011), http://www.npr.org/2011/01/15/
132956628/Assassination-Leaves-Pakistan-Security-Shaken.
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tional and international harms.  In particular, this part discusses the
systematic state-sanctioned persecution of the Ahmadiyya Muslim
Community, a revivalist movement within Islam.  Part IV also exam-
ines the persecution of Pakistan’s Christian and Hindu citizens.  Part
V analyzes the practical steps necessary to ensure Pakistan’s ICCPR
compliance.  Part VI concludes this paper.
PART II: PAKISTAN’S ORIGINAL HUMAN RIGHTS PLATFORM
AND THE ICCPR
a. Background on Pakistan’s Religious Freedom and Freedom of
Expression Platforms
Pakistan was created in 1947 upon a partition from India.4  In-
dian Muslims, anguished from living in Hindu dominated India, de-
manded the creation of their own nation.5  The two-nation State
solution, originally conceived in 1933, emerged with increasing popu-
larity.6  Muhammad Ali Jinnah (1876-1948), a politician and lawyer
who commanded wide respect nationally and internationally, was the
leader of the Muslim League.7  Once he began championing the two-
state solution, the international community took notice.  Often quoted
in the American press regarding his goal of establishing a separate
nation for Indian Muslims, Jinnah offered:
We are a nation with our own distinctive culture and civ-
ilization, language and literature, art and architecture,
names and nomenclature, sense of values and propor-
tion, legal laws and moral codes, customs and calendar,
history and traditions, aptitudes and ambitions, in short,
we have our own distinctive outlook on life and of life.
By all canons of international Law we are a nation.8
Pakistan was founded in large part because India’s minority Muslim
community felt oppressed, unable to truly express their own distinc-
tive culture and values.9  Much like America’s Founding Fathers, Pa-
kistan’s Founding Fathers envisioned a nation free from tyrannical
4 GOVERNMENT OF PAKISTAN, ABOUT PAKISTAN, http://www.pakistan.gov.pk/ (last
visited Oct. 3, 2011).
5 See India-Pakistan: Troubled Relations, BBC NEWS, http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/en-
glish/static/in_depth/south_asia/2002/india_pakistan/timeline/1947.stm (last vis-
ited on Oct. 3, 2011).
6 Id.
7 Muhammad Ali Jinnah, BBC NEWS, http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/historic_
figures/jinnah_mohammad_ali.shtml (last visited Oct. 6, 2011).
8 HECTOR BOLITHO, JINNAH: CREATOR OF PAKISTAN 149 (Oxford Univ. Press 2006)
(1954).
9 See India-Pakistan: Troubled Relations, supra note 5.
4 RICHMOND JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LAW & BUSINESS [Vol. 11:1
rule, free from restrictions of conscience, and equality for all citizens.10
Pakistan’s original Constitution reflected these principles as well.11  In
a policy speech, Jinnah addressed Pakistan’s constituent assembly
days before the nation was officially born describing his vision and
commitment to ensure Pakistan became a nation that championed re-
ligious freedom. He declared,
You are free; you are free to go to your temples, you are
free to go to your mosques or to any other place of wor-
ship in this State of Pakistan.  You may belong to any
religion or caste or creed that has nothing to do with the
business of the State.  As you know, history shows that
in England, conditions, some time ago, were much worse
than those prevailing in India today.  The Roman
Catholics and the Protestants persecuted each other.
Even now there are some States in existence where there
are discriminations made and bars imposed against a
particular class.  Thank God, we are not starting in those
days.  We are starting in the days where there is no dis-
crimination, no distinction between one community and
another, no discrimination between one caste or creed
and another.  We are starting with this fundamental
principle that we are all citizens and equal citizens of one
State.12
After years of deliberation and a near collapse of negotiations, Paki-
stan was born on August 14th, 1947, and Jinnah was elected as its
first Governor-General.13  Jinnah particularly juxtaposed the dire con-
ditions between Protestants and Catholics in England to the dire situ-
ation in India regarding religious discrimination, and made clear that
Pakistan would rise above such discrimination.14  Instead, Pakistan
(which literally means land of the pure)15 was to offer equality to all its
citizens.16  In an address to the United States less than a year after
Pakistan’s creation, Jinnah re-affirmed Pakistan’s commitment of
freedom and pluralism to its new ally:
10 See, e.g., Muhammad Ali Jinnah, President of Pak., Presidential Address to the
Constituent Assembly of Pakistan (Aug. 11, 1947), transcript available at http://
www.pakistani.org/pakistan/legislation/constituent_address_11aug1947.html
[hereinafter Jinnah’s Constituent Assembly Address].
11 See generally PAK. CONST. (1956).
12 Jinnah’s Constituent Assembly Address, supra note 10.
13 Muhammed Ali Jinnah, supra note 7.
14 Id.
15 India-Pakistan: Troubled Relations, supra note 5.
16 Jinnah’s Constituent Assembly Address, supra note 10.
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In any case Pakistan is not going to be a theocratic State
to be ruled by priests with a divine mission.  We have
many non-Muslims — Hindus, Christians, and Parsis —
but they are all Pakistanis.  They will enjoy the same
rights and privileges as any other citizens and will play
their rightful part in the affairs of Pakistan.17
Pakistan’s first Constitution, formed in 1956 eight years after Jinnah’s
death, reflected the aforementioned ideals.  For example, the Preamble
to Pakistan’s Constitution makes the following declarations:
Wherein adequate provision should be made for the mi-
norities freely to profess and practise [sic] their religions
and develop their culture. . .Wherein should be guaran-
teed fundamental rights including equality of status and
of opportunity, equality before law, and freedom of
thought, expression, belief, faith, worship and associa-
tion, and social, economic, and political justice, subject to
law and public morality; Wherein adequate provision
shall be made to safeguard the legitimate interests of mi-
norities and backward and depressed classes;18
The Framers of Pakistan’s Constitution went on to ensure such free-
doms were explicit in the actual Constitution as well.  For example,
Article 8 of Pakistan’s Constitution states, “[e]very citizen shall have
the right to freedom of speech and expression.”19  Likewise, Article 13
adds, “no religious community or denomination shall be prevented
from providing religious instruction for pupils of that community or
denomination in any educational institution maintained wholly by
that community and denomination.”20  Later on, Chapter 2, Article 36
added, “[t]he state shall safeguard the legitimate rights and interests
of minorities, including their due representation in the Federal and
Provincial services.”21  Accordingly, Pakistan’s inaugural cabinet re-
flected the true nature of this declaration and gave representation to
ministers from all faiths.
17 Muhammad Ali Jinnah, President of Pak., Broadcast Talk to the United States
of America on Pakistan (Feb. 1948), transcript available at http://www.jinnah.pk/
2009/09/pakistan-and-her-people-ii/.
18 PAK. CONST. pmbl. (1956).
19 Id. art. 8.
20 Id. art. 13.
21 PAK. CONST. art. 36.
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b. Background to the International Covenant on Civil and Political
Rights
The United Nations adopted the ICCPR on December 16, 1966,
officially implementing it a decade later on March 23, 1976.22  The
ICCPR’s Preamble declares that, “the inherent dignity and. . .equal
and inalienable rights of all members of the human family is the foun-
dation of freedom, justice and peace in the world.”23  Likewise, the Pre-
amble also recognizes that:
. . .in accordance with the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights, the ideal of free human beings enjoying
civil and political freedom and freedom from fear and
want can only be achieved if conditions are created
whereby everyone may enjoy his civil and political
rights, as well as his economic, social and cultural
rights. . .24
In total, the ICCPR records fifty-three articles guaranteeing a wide
array of social, religious, and political rights.25  After signing and rati-
fying the ICCPR in 2010, Pakistan’s President Asif Ali Zardari as-
sured that his administration would, “undertake practical steps for the
implementation of the [ICCPR],” and that his party, “would continue
upholding basic human rights of all individuals regardless of caste,
creed or any other consideration.”26  Pakistan’s Prime Minister Syed
Yousaf Raza Gilani echoed these sentiments,
The government [of Pakistan] is conscious of its interna-
tional commitments. We have ratified CAT [Covenant
Against Torture] and ICCPR. . .We are united in our re-
solve to uproot terrorism from our midst as it represents
negation of human rights and values. We have faced this
challenge with courage, bravery and honour [sic] and we
are committed to continue to safeguard the rights of our
people at all cost.27
In claiming to “continue” to uphold human rights, both Zardari and
Gilani incorrectly and disingenuously present Pakistan as a nation
that upheld human rights prior to their respective administrations.
Such misleading statements notwithstanding, under Zardari and Gi-
22 See International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, G.A. Res. 2200 (XXI)
A, U.N. Doc A/6316 (Dec. 16, 1966) [hereinafter ICCPR].
23 Id.
24 Id.
25 See generally id.
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lani’s rule, Pakistan is currently in violation of at least seven Articles
of the ICCPR.
For example, Pakistan is in violation of ICCPR Article 18(1),
which states,
Everyone shall have the right to freedom of thought, con-
science and religion.  This right shall include freedom to
have or to adopt a religion or belief of his choice, and
freedom, either individually or in community with others
and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief
in worship, observance, practice and teaching.28
Likewise, Article 18(2) adds, “[n]o one shall be subject to coercion
which would impair his freedom to have or to adopt a religion or belief
of his choice.”29  Article 19(1) continues, “[e]veryone shall have the
right to hold opinions without interference.”30  Article 19(2) concludes,
“[e]veryone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right
shall include freedom to seek, receive and impart information and
ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in
print, in the form of art, or through any other media of his choice.”31
Together, Articles 18 and 19 reject religious compulsion and forbid re-
strictions on imparting religious information.  Pakistan’s anti-blas-
phemy legislation, however, directly contravenes the spirit and letter
of these ICCPR articles.
While Article 18 and 19 ensure that every person has certain
inalienable religious freedoms, Article 20 adds a new dimension, en-
suring no person shall be subject to hate campaigns.  Article 20(1) of
the ICCPR states, “[a]ny propaganda for war shall be prohibited by
law.”32  Article 20(2) further adds, “[a]ny advocacy of national, racial
or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hos-
tility or violence shall be prohibited by law.”33  Ignoring this article,
the Government of Pakistan regularly permits hate campaigns against
religious minorities.
Similarly, Article 27 of the ICCPR ensures, “[i]n those States in
which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, persons belonging
to such minorities shall not be denied the right, in community with the
other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess
and practise [sic] their own religion, or to use their own language.”34
28 ICCPR, supra note 22, at art. 18(1).
29 Id. art. 18(2).
30 Id. art. 19(1).
31 Id. art. 19(2).
32 Id. art. 20(1).
33 Id. art. 20(2).
34 Id. art. 27.
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Like Pakistan’s anti-blasphemy laws, Pakistan’s Second Amendment
also undermines the protection these ICCPR Articles guarantee.
Next, Article 25 of the ICCPR guarantees equal representation
in the electorate for every citizen, regardless of distinctions, stating,
Every citizen shall have the right and the opportunity,
without any of the distinctions mentioned in article 2
and without unreasonable restrictions:
(a) To take part in the conduct of public affairs, directly
or through freely chosen representatives;
(b) To vote and to be elected at genuine periodic elec-
tions which shall be by universal and equal suffrage and
shall be held by secret ballot, guaranteeing the free ex-
pression of the will of the electors;
(c) To have access, on general terms of equality, to public
service in his country.35
This article is significant because, as explained in more detail below,
the Pakistani election process is such that religious minorities have
either no representation through systematic disenfranchisement, or
are outright forbidden from running for political office.
Next, Pakistan is in violation of Article 26 of the ICCPR, which
guarantees equal protection under the law:
All persons are equal before the law and are entitled
without any discrimination to the equal protection of the
law. In this respect, the law shall prohibit any discrimi-
nation and guarantee to all persons equal and effective
protection against discrimination on any ground such as
race, colour, sex, language, religion, political or other
opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other
status.36
Contrary to Article 26, the Government of Pakistan repeatedly and de-
liberately ignores its responsibility to protect religious minorities from
attack.
Finally, Article 21 of the ICCPR guarantees the right to peace-
ably assemble:
The right of peaceful assembly shall be recognized.  No
restrictions may be placed on the exercise of this right
other than those imposed in conformity with the law and
which are necessary in a democratic society in the inter-
ests of national security or public safety, public order (or-
35 Id. art. 25.
36 Id. art. 26.
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dre public), the protection of public health or morals or
the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.37
Section IV describes that certain religious minority groups in Pakistan
have been forbidden from peaceful assembly for decades.  Some histor-
ical context of the development of extremism within Pakistan is help-
ful to better understand the source of Pakistan’s various ICCPR
violations.
PART III: PAKISTAN’S EMERGENCE AS A WORLD LEADER IN
HUMAN RIGHTS VIOLATIONS
a. The Birth of Religious Extremism in Pakistan by Abul A’la
Maududi
In addition to understanding the source of Pakistan’s ICCPR
violations, this historical context of Pakistan’s human rights devolu-
tion is essential to properly frame the basis, justification, and need for
international intervention.  Soon after Pakistan won its independence
in 1947, several religious leaders voiced their opposition to Pakistan’s
commitments to freedom of religion and freedom of expression.38  One
of the leading opponents was Abul A’la Maududi, an influential cleric
in 20th century India/Pakistan and founder of the Jamaat-e-Islami
party, a pseudo-religious political organization.39  Maududi harbored a
particular hatred for the Ahmadiyya Muslim Community40 and
wanted the government to legally “expel” its members from Islam.41
While there are complex dogmatic reasons for Maududi’s hatred be-
yond the scope of this discussion, two particular factors motivated his
aggressive behavior.  First, the Ahmadiyya Muslim Community firmly
rejects violence as a means to spread Islam.42  Maududi rejected this
practice and instead defined Islam’s purpose as to destroy all non-Is-
37 Id. art. 21.
38 Pakistan Islamic Assembly: Jamaat-e-Islami-e-Pakistan (JIP), GLOBALSECUR-
ITY.ORG, http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/pakistan/ji.htm (last visited
July 11, 2011).
39 Id.
40 “The Ahmadiyya Muslim Community is a dynamic, fast growing international
revival movement within Islam. Founded in 1889, it spans over 195 countries with
membership exceeding tens of millions.” The Ahmadiyya Muslim Community are
Muslims who “believe that the long-awaited Messiah has come in the person of
Mirza Ghulam Ahmad (1835-1908) of Qadian.” Ahmadiyya Muslim Community:
An Overview, AL ISLAM, http://www.alislam.org/ introduction/index.html (last vis-
ited Oct. 4, 2011); see FRE´DE´RIC GRARE, POLITICAL ISLAM IN THE INDIAN SUBCONTI-
NENT: THE JAMAAT-I-ISLAMI 9 (2001).
41 Kate Zebiri, Book Review, 61 BULL. SCH. ORIENTAL & AFR. STUD. 167, 167-68
(1998) (reviewing SEYYED VALI REZA NASR, MAUDUDI AND THE MAKING OF ISLAMIC
FUNDAMENTALISM (1996)).
42 Ahmadiyya Muslim Community, supra note 40.
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lamic regimes.43 Second, Mirza Ghulam Ahmad of Qadian, in 1889,
founded the Ahmadiyya Muslim Community.44  Ahmad proclaimed he
was the long-awaited Messiah and Mahdi for all religions.45  Maududi
again opposed the belief that any Messiah or Prophet could appear af-
ter Prophet Muhammad, declared anyone who accepted such a belief
to be an apostate, and, therefore, demanded Ahmadi Muslims be de-
clared a non-Muslim apostate minority.46
Prior to Pakistan’s formation, and even in the early years after
Pakistan’s formation, anti-Ahmadi Muslim sentiments were scattered
and random.  A transformation took place, however, in 1953 when
Maududi’s Jamaat-i-Islami party launched nationwide riots against
the Ahmadiyya Muslim Community.47  In these riots, dozens of mem-
bers of the Ahmadiyya Muslim Community were killed, hundreds
more were injured, while countless shops, houses, and mosques be-
longing to Ahmadi Muslims were set ablaze.48  Likewise, Ahmadi Mus-
lims faced large-scale boycotts of their businesses while extremists
continued to issue threats of violence to the Pakistani Government,
unless the Government complied and declared Ahmadi Muslims to be
an apostate minority.49
In response, A. T. Naqvi, Pakistan’s Chief Commissioner, pub-
licly reemphasized his administration’s policy that every Pakistani cit-
izen had perfect freedom of religion, and that future attempts to
interfere with such freedoms would not be tolerated.50  Justice Munir,
Chief Justice of the Punjab Court of Inquiry, thoroughly investigated
the cause of the riots, and ultimately rejected Maududi’s desires to de-
43 Maududi wrote, “Islam wishes to destroy all states and governments anywhere
on the face of the earth which are opposed to the ideology and programme of Islam
regardless of the country or the Nation which rules it. . . Islam requires the
earth—not just a portion, but the whole planet . . . because the entire mankind
should benefit from the ideology and welfare programme [of Islam]. . . Towards
this end, Islam wishes to press into service all forces which can bring about a
revolution and a composite term for the use of all these forces is ‘Jihad.’ . . . the
objective of the Islamic ‘ Jihaˆd’ is to eliminate the rule of an un-Islamic system and
establish in its stead an Islamic system of state rule.” S. ABUL A’LA MAUDUDI, JIHAD
IN ISLAM 6-7, 22 (The Holy Koran Publ’g House 2006) (1939) (emphasis added).
44 Ahmadiyya Muslim Community, supra note 40.
45 The Promised Messiah: A Prophet to Unite Mankind in the Latter Days, AL IS-
LAM, http://www.alislam.org/topics/messiah/index.php (last visited Oct. 4, 2011).
46 Pakistan Islamic Assembly, supra note 38.
47 Id.
48 History of Persecution 1951 to 1960, THEPERSECUTION.ORG, http://www.theper-
secution.org/facts/h51-60.html (last visited Oct. 4, 2011).
49 Id.
50 REPORT OF THE COURT OF INQUIRY CONSTITUTED UNDER PUNJAB ACT II OF 1954
TO ENQUIRE INTO PUNJAB DISTURBANCES OF 1953 76 (Punjab 1954), available at
http://www.thepersecution.org/dl/report_1953.pdf.
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clare Ahmadi Muslims as apostates.51  He concluded that it would not
only be unconstitutional, but also impossible to legally “expel” some-
one from Islam.52
Likewise, then Governor-General of Pakistan, Khwaja Nazim-
ud-Din, added that, “[i]t was no part of the duties of the Government to
declare a section of the population as a minority . . .[and] that he was
not prepared to have the Ahmadi [Muslims] declared a minority.”53
Governor-General Nazim-ud-Din unfortunately also added, however,
that he was, “not prepared to tell the [clerics] [directly that he would
not declare Ahmadis as non-Muslims], as that would have resulted in
a “head-on clash” with them, which he wished to avoid.”54  He
continued,
. . .it was not in the interest of the country to press the
Demands and very difficult to accept them, that even in
the Constitutional document it would not be easy to
evolve a definition of the term “Muslim” which would de-
bar the Ahmadis and at the same time not debar any
other section.55
This statement was dangerous because of the precedent it established.
That is, it was not a matter of if an appropriate definition of a “Mus-
lim” could be found, but when such a definition would be found, at
which point, members of the Ahmadiyya Muslim Community could be
legally discriminated against through expulsion from the larger Mus-
lim community.
Though dozens of members of the Ahmadiyya Muslim Commu-
nity were murdered in the 1953 riots and throughout the 1960s, these
attacks were not state-sanctioned, nor considered legal in any capac-
ity.  In fact, Maududi faced material consequences for his violent
preaching; in 1948 and again in 1964, Maududi was sent to prison as a
direct result of his violent teachings against members of the
Ahmadiyya Muslim Community.56  In 1953, owing to the loss of life his
preaching caused, the Government of Pakistan sentenced Maududi to
death—only to have his sentence commuted to life in prison, and even-
tually absolved completely for unknown reasons.57
Through this first test of Pakistan’s Constitution, cracks al-
ready appeared in the Pakistani Government’s promise of free speech
51 See generally id.
52 Id.
53 Id. at 291.
54 Id.
55 Id
56 10 Abu-I A’la Mawdudi, in ENCYCLOPEDIA OF WORLD BIOGRAPHY 353, 354 (2d
ed. 2004).
57 Id.
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for all its citizens.  For example, on February 27, 1953, the Govern-
ment banned the Ahmadiyya Muslim Community from publishing
their daily newspaper, Al Fazl, for one year.58  This act violated the
Article 1, Chapter 19 freedom of press guarantee of Pakistan’s Consti-
tution.  When a surrogate publication was published, entitled, Farooq,
the Government acted to ban it as well.59  Regardless, this ban lasted
only a year, and no state sanctioned restrictions were placed upon re-
ligious minorities in Pakistan.  Though extremists like Maududi at-
tempted to promote discriminatory legislation through the legal
process, Pakistan’s promise to protect minorities and their freedoms
largely remained true.
b. Religious Extremism Begins Infiltrating Pakistan’s Secular
Government
The first substantive blow to religious freedom in Pakistan
emerged in 1962.  In that year, the Pakistan Advisory Council for Is-
lamic Ideology added a repugnancy clause to the Constitution.  The
clause required that, “[a]ll existing laws shall be brought in conformity
with the Injunctions of Islam as laid down in the Holy Quran and Sun-
nah,60 in this Part referred to as the Injunctions of Islam, and no law
shall be enacted which is repugnant to such Injunctions.”61  This
clause effectively gave clerics vast power to repeal any secular law re-
pugnant to their extremist understanding of Islam.  Pakistan also
eventually created a Federal Shariah Court in 1986,62 and passed the
Enforcement of Shari’ah Act of 1991, to ensure no laws were imple-
mented that could be considered offensive to Islam or Pakistan’s Con-
stitution.63 Democracy Reporting International (“DRI”) reports that
these provisions have severely diminished human rights in Pakistan.
DRI is an international, non-partisan and independent, not-for-profit
organization specifically funded to report on Pakistan’s level of ICCPR
compliance.64 DRI’s report concludes that Pakistan used these repug-
nancy clauses as legal justification to make several ICCPR reserva-
58 History of Persecution 1951 to 1960, supra note 48.
59 Id.
60 Sunnah are the actions of the Prophet Muhammad. See M. Cherif Bassiouni &
Gamal M. Badr, The Shari’ah: Sources, Interpretation, and Rule-Making, 1 UCLA
J. ISLAMIC & NEAR E.L. 135, 150 (2002).
61 PAK. CONST. art. 227.
62 See David F. Forte, Apostasy and Blasphemy in Pakistan, 10 CONN. J. INT’L L.
27, 35-37 (1994).
63 Pakistan Enforcement of Shari’ah Act, No. 10 of 1991, available at http://www.
pakistani.org/pakistan/legislation/1991/actXof1991.html.
64 See Pakistan, DEMOCRACY REPORTING INT’L, http://www.democracy-reporting.
org/programmes/pakistan.html (last visited Oct. 11, 2011) [hereinafter DEMOC-
RACY REPORTING INT’L].
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tions.65  Relevant to this discussion, Pakistan specifically declared
that the provisions of the ICCPR Article 12 (liberty of movement), Ar-
ticle 18 (freedom of thought, conscience, and religion), Article 19 (free-
dom of opinion), and Article 25 (participation in public affairs, right to
vote) shall be so applied to the extent that they are not repugnant to
the Provisions of the Constitution of Pakistan and the Shariah Laws.66
The authority this repugnancy clause gives clerics has been devastat-
ing to efforts to strengthen democracy in Pakistan because the final
decision-making authority rests not with the people of Pakistan, nor
Pakistan’s legislature, but with the extremist clerics managing the Is-
lamic Council (i.e. Shariah Court).67
Pakistan further regressed when it nationalized all educational
institutions in 1972.68  This act violated Chapter 1, Article 22(3)(a) of
Pakistan’s Constitution.69 On July 28, 1996, the Government of the
Punjab Province issued a gazette notification to enable owners of na-
tionalized educational institutions to regain ownership over their in-
stitutions, provided the original owners fulfill certain terms and
65 See generally Pakistan’s Reservations to the International Covenant on Civil
and Political Rights (Democracy Reporting Int’l, Briefing Paper No. 4), http://
www.democracyreporting.org/files/dri_briefing_paper_4_-gop_reservations_on_
iccpr.pdf.
66 UNITED NATIONS, STATUS PAGE FOR ICCPR, http://treaties.un.org/Pages/
ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-4&chapter=4&lang=en#EndDec
(last visited Oct. 24, 2011).
67 PAK. CONST. art. 230(1) (“Functions of Islamic Council.
(1) The functions of the Islamic Council shall be,
(a) to make recommendations to [Majlis-e-Shoora (Parliament)] and the Provin-
cial Assemblies as to the ways and means of enabling and encouraging the Mus-
lims of Pakistan to order their lives individually and collectively in all respects in
accordance with the principles and concepts of Islam as enunciated in the Holy
Quran and Sunnah;
(b) to advise a House, a Provincial Assembly, the President or a Governor on any
question referred to the Council as to whether a proposed law is or is not repug-
nant to the Injunctions of Islam;
(c) to make recommendations as to the measures for bringing existing laws into
conformity with the Injunctions of Islam and the stages by which such measures
should be brought into effect; and
(d) to compile in a suitable form, for the guidance of [Majlis-e-Shoora (Parlia-
ment)] and the Provincial Assemblies, such Injunctions of Islam as can be given
legislative effect.”).
68 Education in Pakistan, PAKISTANEDUCATION.INFO, http://www.pakistaneduca-
tion.info/edusystem/ (last visited Oct. 7, 2011).
69 PAK. CONST. art. 22(3)(a) (“no religious community or denomination shall be
prevented from providing religious instruction for pupils of that community or de-
nomination in any educational institution maintained wholly by that community
and denomination.”).
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conditions.70  The Ahmadiyya Muslim Community fulfilled the re-
quired obligations, including a Rs. 11,012,483 deposit into the govern-
ment treasury.71  Similar steps were taken under a revised July 2002
notification plan to denationalize educational institutions.72  To date,
however, and despite numerous reminders to the Government of Paki-
stan from the Ahmadiyya Muslim Community, the Government has
refused to return the illegally nationalized institutions.73  This nation-
alization exists even though the Ahmadiyya Muslim Community has
fulfilled all obligations to retrieve their property, it exists despite the
seizures’ unconstitutionality, and it exists though other organizations
have regained ownership over their respective institutions.74  In fact,
other organizations received their institutions back as early as the
mid-1980’s.75 By maintaining control over schools belonging to the
Ahmadiyya Muslim Community, Pakistan is restricting their freedom
to “seek, receive, and impart information,” in violation of Article 19(2)
of the ICCPR.76  Once the Government of Pakistan nationalized all ed-
ucation systems in 1972, it subsequently introduced the Second
Amendment to Pakistan’s Constitution in 1974.77  This Amendment
signaled a new era of state-sponsored human rights abuses. Going for-
ward, the Government of Pakistan defined what a Pakistani citizen
was, and was not, allowed to believe.
c. The Second Amendment and the End of Religious Freedom in
Pakistan
By passing the Second Amendment to Pakistan’s Constitution
in 1974, officially declaring members of the Ahmadiyya Muslim Com-
munity to be a non-Muslim minority, President and Prime Minister
Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto opened the doors of extremism unabated to infil-
trate Pakistan’s once secular leadership.78 The Constitution’s Second
Amendment declares:
70 THEPERSECUTION.ORG, PERSECUTION OF AHMADIS IN PAKISTAN DURING THE






75 Education in Pakistan, supra note 68.
76 “Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall include
freedom to seek, receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless
of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in print, in the form of art, or through any
other media of his choice.” ICCPR, supra note 22, at art. 19(2).
77 PAK. CONST. amend. II.
78 See, e.g., GRARE, supra note 40, at 37.
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A person who does not believe in the absolute and un-
qualified finality of The Prophethood of MUHAMMAD
(Peace be upon him), the last of the Prophets or claims to
be a Prophet, in any sense of the word or of any descrip-
tion whatsoever, after MUHAMMAD (Peace be upon
him), or recognizes such a claimant as a Prophet or relig-
ious reformer, is not a Muslim for the purposes of the
Constitution or law.79
Maududi and Jamaat-e-Islami achieved what they could not two de-
cades prior, and their impact was more influential than many realize.
For example, these extremists ultimately hastened the creation of
modern day terrorist groups such as Hizbul Mujahideen.80 A 1993
United States Congressional report states that, “Islamist indoctrina-
tion and other assistance is provided [to Hizbul Mujahideen] [by] the
Jamaat-i-Islami of Pakistan.”81 Likewise, historian Philip Jenkins re-
ports that Maududian teachings directly and heavily influenced Qutb,
the founder of the terrorist organization known as the Muslim Broth-
erhood.82 Expectedly, once Maududian ideologies helped change Paki-
stan’s Constitution, human rights rapidly degenerated.
Pakistan’s 1974 constitutional amendment is in complete con-
tradiction to Jinnah, who said, “You may belong to any religion or
caste or creed that has nothing to do with the business of the State.”83
More significantly, it contradicts Pakistan’s Preamble and Chapter 1,
Article 19 of Pakistan’s Constitution, which guarantees freedom of
speech and freedom of expression.84 Likewise, Pakistan’s Second
Amendment violates Articles 18 and 19 of the UDHR, which also guar-
antee freedom of conscience and freedom of religion.85  Relevant to this
discussion, Pakistan has not repealed the Second Amendment to its
Constitution despite signing and ratifying the ICCPR. Article 18(1) re-
quires ICCPR member nations to ensure its citizens have the right to
“freedom of thought, conscience and religion.”86  Therefore, Pakistan’s
79 PAK. CONST. amend. II(3).
80 HOUSE REPUBLICAN RESEARCH COMMITTEE, 103RD CONG., TASK FORCE ON TER-
RORISM AND UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE, THE NEW ISLAMIST INTERNATIONAL 37-51
(1993), available at http://www.fas.org/irp/congress/1993_rpt/house_repub_report.
html.
81 Id.
82 PHILIP JENKINS, GOD’S CONTINENT: CHRISTIANITY, ISLAM, AND EUROPE’S RELIG-
IOUS CRISIS 129 (2007).
83 Jinnah’s Constituent Assembly Address, supra note 10.
84 PAK. CONST. art. 19.
85 Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217 (III) A, at art. 18, U.N.
Doc. A/RES/217(III) A (Dec. 10, 1948) [hereinafter UDHR].
86 ICCPR, supra note 22, at art. 18(1) (“Everyone shall have the right to freedom
of thought, conscience and religion. This right shall include freedom to have or to
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decision to uphold President Bhutto’s Second Amendment directly un-
dermines Article 18(1) of the ICCPR.
Though Pakistan had violated its own Constitution and the
UDHR, one basic hope was that despite the Second Amendment, mem-
bers of the Ahmadiyya Muslim Community would be afforded protec-
tion as a religious minority.  This was the purpose of Chapter 2, Article
36 of Pakistan’s Constitution.87 Unfortunately, the exact opposite oc-
curred.  The Government of Pakistan took no active measures to pro-
tect members of the Ahmadiyya Muslim Community from attack, nor
pursued instigators to prevent future attacks.88  Instead, the Govern-
ment tacitly approved the persecution through its silence.  In fact, vio-
lence against Ahmadi Muslims in the 1970s surpassed the brutality
suffered in the previous two decades combined.  During the 1950s and
1960s, prior to the passage of Pakistan’s Second Amendment, twenty-
four total members of the Ahmadiyya Muslim Community were killed
at the hands of extremists for their faith.89  But, in the 1970s alone,
extremists murdered thirty-nine Ahmadi Muslims.90  In addition,
Ahmadi Muslims suffered a dramatic increase in boycotts, arsons, des-
ecrated graves, and vandalism to their homes and mosques.91  Rather
than placate the violent desires of extremists like Maududi, the Sec-
ond Amendment further motivated extremists to infuse a dictatorial
form of Islam into Pakistan in place of secular laws.  The dictatorial
form of Islam that extremists desired literally manifested itself only a
few years later.  Once General Zia ul Haq assumed control of Pakistan
via a 1977 military coup,92 he actively targeted religious minorities,
and Ahmadi Muslims in particular, with anti-blasphemy legislation.
Ali Dayan Hasan, a senior researcher for Human Rights Watch Asia
reports, “[a]s a consequence [of anti-blasphemy laws], Ahmadi
adopt a religion or belief of his choice, and freedom, either individually or in com-
munity with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in
worship, observance, practice and teaching.”).
87 PAK. CONST. art. 36  (“The state shall safeguard the legitimate rights and inter-
ests of minorities, including their due representation in the Federal and Provincial
services.”).
88 Amnesty Int’l, Pakistan: Killing of Ahmadis Continues Amid Impunity, AI In-
dex ASA 33/028/2005 (Oct. 11, 2005), available at http://www.amnesty.org/en/li-
brary/asset/ASA33/028/2005/en/89ea605d-d49f-11dd-8a23-d58a49c0d652/asa3302
82005en.html.
89 History of Persecution 1961 to 1970, THEPERSECUTION.ORG (Mar. 10, 2004),
http://www.thepersecution.org/facts/h61-70.html.
90 History of Persecution 1971 to 1980, THEPERSECUTION.ORG (Mar. 10, 2004),
http://www.thepersecution.org/facts/h71-80.html.
91 Id.
92 Timeline: Pakistan, BBC NEWS, http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/country_
profiles/1156716.stm (last updated Oct. 5, 2011).
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mosques have been burned, their graves desecrated and their very ex-
istence criminalized.”93  These anti-blasphemy laws have exerted such
a powerful influence over Pakistan that despite Pakistan’s signing and
ratifying the ICCPR in 2008 and 2010, respectively,94 the laws yet re-
main in full force, unrestricted.
PART IV: PAKISTAN’S ICCPR VIOLATIONS AND THE
DELETERIOUS CONSEQUENCES
a. Pakistan Signs and Ratifies the ICCPR with Reservations
Pakistan initially signed and ratified the ICCPR with several
reservations.95  On June 23, 2010 Pakistan made reservations to Arti-
cles 3, 6, 7, 18, and 19, stating, “[the] Islamic Republic of Pakistan
declares that the provisions of Articles 3, 6, 7, 18 and 19 shall be so
applied to the extent that they are not repugnant to the Provisions of
the Constitution of Pakistan and the Shariah laws.”96  These reserva-
tions subjected the ICCPR to the Pakistani Constitution’s approval,
rather than the other way around, in effect voiding the purpose of the
ICCPR as an internationally binding treaty.  Likewise, Pakistan made
a reservation to Article 25 of the ICCPR, stating, “[the] Islamic Repub-
lic of Pakistan declares that the provisions of Article 25 shall be so
applied to the extent that they are not repugnant to the Provisions of
the Constitution of Pakistan.”97  Thus, Pakistan ratified the ICCPR
while creating a loophole for itself to avoid responsibility for the rele-
vant human rights requirements set forth in these Articles.
On the question of whether the ICCPR may exercise valid ju-
risdiction over Pakistan, ICCPR Article 2(1) requires each State Party
under the ICCPR to “respect and to ensure to all individuals within its
territory and subject to its jurisdiction the rights recognized in the pre-
sent Covenant, without distinction of any kind, such as race, color, sex,
language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin,
property, birth or other status.98 Likewise, ICCPR Article 2(3) ensures
those whose rights have been violated shall have an effective and en-
forceable remedy, as provided by a competent authority.99  Therefore,
93 Ali Dayan Hasan, HUM. RTS. WATCH, http://www.hrw.org/bios/ali-dayan-hasan
(last visited Oct. 23, 2011); Ali Dayan Hasan, Indonesia Risks Taking Pakistan’s
Path to Intolerance, JAKARTA GLOBE (Apr. 18, 2011), http://www.thejakartaglobe.
com/opinion/indonesia-risks-taking-pakistans-path-to-intolerance/435924.
94 See ICCPR, supra note 22; STATUS PAGE FOR ICCPR, supra note 66.
95 STATUS PAGE FOR ICCPR, supra note 66.
96 Id.
97 Id.
98 ICCPR, supra note 22, at art. 2(1).
99 Id. art. 2(3) (“Each State Party to the present Covenant undertakes:
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despite her reservations, Pakistan is fundamentally required to pro-
tect the rights of all its citizens “without distinction of any kind.”100
In addition to making numerous reservations, Pakistan ab-
stained from signing the First Optional Protocol to the ICCPR.101  The
First Optional Protocol to the ICCPR “allows individuals, whose coun-
tries are party to the ICCPR and the protocol, who claim their rights
under the ICCPR have been violated, and who have exhausted all do-
mestic remedies, to submit written communications to the UN Human
Rights Committee.”102  Because Pakistan has not signed the First Op-
tional Protocol, Pakistani citizens who face human rights violations
and have exhausted the domestic legal process without relief, are left
without any recourse to alleviate their suffering under Pakistan’s ille-
gal apparatus of state-sanctioned persecution.
b. Pakistan Retracts Several of Its ICCPR Reservations
Under pressure from the European Union (“EU”), however, Pa-
kistan announced in late June 2011 that it is retracting several of its
ICCPR reservations.103 Pakistan recanted these reservations after the
EU objected that the reservations were illegal according to Article 19
of the Vienna Convention.104  Article 19(c) of the Vienna Convention
holds that a State may not make a reservation if it is incompatible
(a) To ensure that any person whose rights or freedoms as herein recognized are
violated shall have an effective remedy, notwithstanding that the violation has
been committed by persons acting in an official capacity;
(b) To ensure that any person claiming such a remedy shall have his right thereto
determined by competent judicial, administrative or legislative authorities, or by
any other competent authority provided for by the legal system of the State, and to
develop the possibilities of judicial remedy;
(c) To ensure that the competent authorities shall enforce such remedies when
granted.”).
100 UDHR, supra note 85, at art. 2.
101 UNITED NATIONS, STATUS PAGE FOR OPTIONAL PROTOCOL OF THE ICCPR (Oct.
24, 2011), http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no
=IV-5&chapter=4&lang=en.
102 UNITED NATIONS, WHY AN OPTIONAL PROTOCOL?, CONVENTION ON THE ELIMINA-
TION OF ALL FORMS OF DISCRIMINATION AGAINST WOMEN, http://www.un.org/
womenwatch/daw/cedaw/protocol/why.htm (last visited Oct. 2. 2011).
103 Pakistan Decides to Withdraw Most of Reservations on ICCPR, UNCAT, THE
NATION (June 23, 2010), http://www.nation.com.pk/pakistan-news-newspaper-
daily-english-online/Regional/Islamabad/23-Jun-2011/Pakistan-decides-to-with-
draw-most-of-reservations-on-ICCPR-UNCAT [hereinafter Pakistan Withdraws
Reservations].
104 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties art. 19, May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331 (“A State may, when signing, ratifying, accepting, approving or ac-
ceding to a treaty, formulate a reservation unless:
(a) the reservation is prohibited by the treaty;
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with the international treaty’s purpose.105  In their report on Paki-
stan’s ICCPR reservations, DRI concluded:
[b]y indicating that the mentioned ICCPR articles only
apply as far as they are in line with Pakistan’s Constitu-
tion, the reservation introduces a de facto hierarchy of
norms by which national law supersedes international
obligations. No real international rights or obligations
have thus been accepted.106
Considering UN Human Rights Committee General Comment 24, DRI
further concluded that Pakistan’s reservations are illegal because they
are unspecific, not transparent, and apply an unlawful hierarchy of
norms (i.e. domestic laws supersede the ICCPR).107
In sum, Pakistan withdrew its reservations on Articles 6, 7, 12,
13, 18, 19 and 40 of the ICCPR, while the Article 3 reservation was
narrowed to Personal Law and Law of Evidence, and the Article 25
reservation was restricted to the election of Pakistan’s President.108
These retractions, though a step in the right direction, have not
changed Pakistan’s discriminatory public policy towards its religious
minorities, nor decreased the violence to which religious minorities in
Pakistan are subject.  A litany of tragic instances of popular persecu-
tion of religious minorities in Pakistan persists.  For example, in July
2011, religious extremists murdered an Ahmadi Muslim in Pakistan
on account of his faith.109  More recently, in September 2011, an
Ahmadi Muslim mosque under construction was razed without due
process.110  Also in September 2011, an Ahmadi Muslim was murdered
as he slept, after police repeatedly ignored his requests for protection,
despite the constant death threats he received on account of his
faith.111  Another Ahmadi Muslim was shot three times on September
(b) the treaty provides that only specified reservations, which do not include the
reservation in question, may be made; or
(c) in cases not falling under sub-paragraphs (a) and (b), the reservation is incom-
patible with the object and purpose of the treaty.”).
105 Id.
106 DEMOCRACY REPORTING INT’L, supra note 64, at 3 (emphasis added).
107 Id. at 2-3.
108 See id.
109 List of Martyres, THEPERSECUTION.ORG, http://www.thepersecution.org/facts/
martyred.html (last visited Oct. 9, 2011).
110 Owais Raza, Caving in to Pressure: Ahmadi Place of Worship Demolished, THE
EXPRESS TRIBUNE (Sept. 4, 2011), http://tribune.com.pk/story/244500/caving-in-to-
pressure-ahmadi-place-of-worship-demolished/.
111 Shamsul Islam, Suspected Hate Crime: Ahmadi Man Shot Dead is Faisalabad,
THE EXPRESS TRIBUNE (Sept. 5, 2011), http://tribune.com.pk/story/245094/sus-
pected-hate-crime-ahmadi-man-shot-dead-in-faisalabad/.
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8th, 2011 after a Khatam-e-Nabuwat rally.112  This rally, significant
for several reasons, is held annually to celebrate the anniversary of
Pakistan’s 1974 declaration that Ahmadi Muslims are apostates,113
consistently calling for violence against them.114
Critics may argue that Pakistan only recently retracted its
ICCPR reservations, and therefore needs time to substantively begin
protecting religious minorities per ICCPR requirements.  But if Paki-
stan’s retractions held any clout, why permit a conference in celebra-
tion of a constitutional amendment in direct opposition to ICCPR
obligations?115  Moreover, that the attacker attempted to murder an
Ahmadi Muslim after the rally demonstrates the influence of these
hate-mongering rallies. Likewise, neither Asia Bibi, a Pakistani Chris-
tian woman accused of blasphemy, nor any other of the countless
Pakistanis currently imprisoned for blasphemy should still be behind
bars.116  Instead, Asia Bibi is still imprisoned and on death row for her
alleged blasphemy, as are numerous other Christians and Ahmadi
Muslims.117  While repealing discriminatory legislation may reasona-
bly take longer than just a few months, taking simple actions to re-
lease prisoners of conscience should not.  In maintaining the illegal
detention of people like Asia Bibi, despite retracting its ICCPR reser-
vations, Pakistan demonstrates that it has not changed its discrimina-
tory public policy against religious minorities.
c. Pakistan’s ICCPR Violations Through Anti-Blasphemy
Legislation
Prime Minister Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto reasoned that passage of
the Second Amendment would appease clerics enough to stop the vio-
lence perpetrated against members of the Ahmadiyya Muslim Com-
munity.118  Unfortunately for all parties involved, Bhutto’s decision
only acted as an accelerant for extremism to strengthen its grip on
112 Rana Tanveer, Ahmadi Shot, Injured on ‘Khatam-e-Nabuwat Day, THE EX-
PRESS TRIBUNE (Sept. 8, 2011), http://tribune.com.pk/story/247482/ahmedi-shot-in-
jured-on-khatam-e-nabuwat-day/.
113 Id.
114 See U.S. COMM’N ON INT’L RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, ANNUAL REPORT OF THE
UNITED STATES COMMISSION ON INTERNATIONAL RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 114 (2011)
[hereinafter U.S. COMM’N ON INT’L RELIGIOUS FREEDOM].
115 ICCPR, supra note 22, at art. 20(2) (“Any advocacy of national, racial or relig-
ious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence
shall be prohibited by law.”).
116 Asia Bibi: A Call for Mercy Campaign, PERSECUTION.COM, http://www.persecu-
tion.com/public/newsroom.aspx?story_ID=NDA2 (last visited Aug. 16, 2011).
117 Id.
118 Interview with Pakistani Colonel Rafiuddin, YOUTUBE (Aug. 24, 2010), http://
www.youtube.com/watch?v=i5qk-65MDC4.
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Pakistani politics and legislature.  Once the Second Amendment be-
came law, clerics pressed Bhutto to do more to restrict the Ahmadiyya
Muslim Community and other religious minorities from propagating
their faith, though Bhutto resisted.119  General Zia gained dramatic
popularity due to his mutual support of, and by, top clerics of Paki-
stan.  Bhutto’s diminishing influence combined with Zia’s increasing
popularity, enabled Zia to seize control of Pakistan via a 1977 military
coup.120  Zia claimed the coup was necessary, accusing Bhutto of wide-
spread voter fraud and questionable murder allegations.121
In 1980, President Zia furthered the extremist cause when he
created a special Federal Shariat Court designed to evaluate Paki-
stan’s current legislation to ensure they were not repugnant to Islamic
teachings.122  By 1986, the Federal Shariat Court had invalidated 55
federal laws and 212 provincial laws as being contrary to the extremist
clerics understanding of Islam, essentially exercising the repugnancy
clause Pakistan had introduced in 1962.123  The stage now set, anti-
blasphemy legislation was officially passed in Pakistan on April 26th,
1984 under the now infamous Ordinance XX124 (currently known as
the Pakistan Penal Code (“PPC”)).  Subsections 298-B and 298-C of
then Ordinance XX made it a criminal offense for members of the
Ahmadiyya Muslim Community to call themselves Muslim, pose as a
Muslim, refer to their places of worship as Masjids [mosques], state
the customary Islamic greeting of Asalaamo Alaikum, practice or prop-
agate their faith in any public or private capacity, use Islamic termi-
nology in general, or engage in any behavior so as to injure the feelings
of the Constitutionally approved Muslims.125  Any member of the
Ahmadiyya Muslim Community caught engaging in any of these now
119 Ouster of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto, STORY OF PAKISTAN (JUNE 1, 2003), http://www.
storyofpakistan.com/articletext.asp?artid=A143.
120 Timeline: Pakistan, supra note 93.
121 Craig Baxter, Historical Settings, in PAKISTAN: A COUNTRY STUDY 3, 64 (Peter
Blood ed., 6th ed. 1995).
122 See Forte, supra note 62, at 37 (“Shariat benches within the superior courts
were displaced, and a separate and stronger Federal Shariat Court was created . . .
If the Shariat Court found a law to be in conflict with the injunctions of Islam, the
invalid portion of the law was voided, and the President directed to take steps to
assure that the law was brought into conformity with the injunctions of Islam.”).
123 Id.
124 PAK. PENAL CODE §§ 298B, 298C (made part of Penal Code by Presidential Or-
dinance No. 20 (1984), THE GAZETTE OF PAKISTAN EXTRAORDINARY, Apr. 26, 1984).
125 Id. (“298B. Misuse of epithets, descriptions and titles, etc., reserved for certain
holy personages or places.
(1) Any person of the Quadiani group or the Lahori group (who call themselves
‘Ahmadis’ or by any other name) who by words, either spoken or written, or by
visible representation;
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illegal activities was punishable with “imprisonment of either descrip-
tion for a term which may extend up to three years and shall also be
liable to a fine.”126  Though Pakistan has signed and ratified the
ICCPR, these laws are still in effect today in violation of Article’s 18,
19, and 27.127  Article 27 ensures all minorities “shall not be denied
the right. . .to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practice their
(a) refers to, or addresses, any person, other than a Caliph or companion of the
Holy Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him),as ‘Ameerul Mumineen’, ‘Khalifa-
tui-Mumineen’, ‘Khalifa-tul-Muslimeen’, ‘Sahaabi’ or ‘Razi Allah Anho’
(b) refers to, or addresses any person other than a wife of the Holy Prophet
Muhammad (peace on him) as ‘Ummul-Mumineen’
(c) refers to, or addresses, any person, other than a member of the family (Ahle-
bait) of the Holy Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him), as ‘Ahle-bait’; or
(d) refers to, or names, or calls, his place of worship as ‘Masjid’;
shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term which may
extend to three years and shall also be liable to fine.
(2) Any person of the Quadiani group or Lahori group (who call themselves
Ahmadis or by any other name) who by words, either spoken or written, or by
visible representation, refers to the mode or form of call to prayers followed by his
faith as ‘Azan’ or recites Azan as used by the Muslims, shall be punished with
imprisonment of either description for a term which may extend to three years,
and shall also be liable to fine.
(3) 298-C. Person of Quadiani group etc., calling himself a Muslim or preaching or
propagating his faith.
Any person of the Quadiani group or the Lahori group (who call themselves
‘Ahmadis’ or by any other name), who, directly or indirectly, poses himself as Mus-
lim, or calls, or refers to, his faith as Islam, or preaches or propagates his faith, or
invites others to accept his faith, by words, either spoken or written, or by visible
representations, or in any manner whatsoever outrages the religious feelings of
Muslims, shall be punished with imprisonment of either description for a term
which may extend to three years and shall also be liable to fine.”).
126 Id. § 298C.
127 ICCPR, supra note 22, at art. 18(1) (“Everyone shall have the right to freedom
of thought, conscience and religion. This right shall include freedom to have or to
adopt a religion or belief of his choice, and freedom, either individually or in com-
munity with others and in public or private, to manifest his religion or belief in
worship, observance, practice and teaching.”); id. art. 18(2) (“No one shall be sub-
ject to coercion which would impair his freedom to have or to adopt a religion or
belief of his choice.”); id. art. 19(1) (“Everyone shall have the right to hold opinions
without interference.”); id. art. 19(2) (“Everyone shall have the right to freedom of
expression; this right shall include freedom to seek, receive and impart informa-
tion and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in
print, in the form of art, or through any other media of his choice.”); id. art. 27 (“In
those States in which ethnic, religious or linguistic minorities exist, persons be-
longing to such minorities shall not be denied the right, in community with the
other members of their group, to enjoy their own culture, to profess and practice
their own religion, or to use their own language.”).
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own religion.”128  Under Ordinance XX Section 298-B and 298-C, how-
ever, a member of the Ahmadiyya Muslim Community caught “behav-
ing as a Muslim” is liable to arrest and fine.129
General Zia then added Section 295-C to Ordinance XX in
1986.130  While punishments to prior offenses were limited to fine and
imprisonment, Zia now introduced the death penalty for anyone con-
victed of insulting the Prophet Muhammad.131  Under Subsection 295-
C, General Zia extended the application of anti-blasphemy legislation
from the Ahmadiyya Muslim Community to all religious minorities.132
Ordinance XX Section 295-C also violates the ICCPR Articles 18, 19,
and 27.133  A recent demonstration of this intolerant law that has
swept worldwide headlines is the case of Asia Bibi, a Pakistani Chris-
tian woman accused and convicted of violating 295-C.134  Bibi is cur-
rently on death row in Pakistan only for allegedly insulting Prophet
Muhammad.135  In December 2010, Yousef Qureshi, an influential
cleric, offered a $6,000 reward for killing Asia Bibi; the Government of
Pakistan remained silent and took no action against Qureshi for his
incitement to violence.136  Likewise, Amir Liaquat Hussain, Pakistan’s
former federal minister for religious affairs, declared on his popular
television show that it was both necessary and Islamic to kill Ahmadi
Muslims.137  As a result, within two days, two Ahmadi Muslims were
murdered—police made no arrests.138  Both the Qureshi and Hussain
128 Id. art. 27.
129 PAK. PENAL CODE §§ 295B, 295C (made part of Penal Code by Presidential Or-
dinance No. 20 (1984), THE GAZETTE OF PAKISTAN EXTRAORDINARY, Apr. 26, 1984).
130 See § 295C (“Use of derogatory remarks, etc. in respect of the Holy Prophet:
Whoever by words, either spoken or written, or by visible representation, or by any
imputation, innuendo, or insinuation, directly or indirectly, defiles the sacred
name of the Holy Prophet Muhammad (peace be upon him) shall be punished with
death, or imprisonment for life, and shall also be liable to fine.”); Religious Free-
dom in India and Pakistan, U.S. COMM’N ON INT’L RELIGIOUS FREEDOM (2000),
http://www.uscirf.gov/countries/1023.html?task=view (offering a chronology of
anti-Ahmaddiya legislation in Pakistan).
131 § 295C.
132 Id.
133 Compare id., with ICCPR, supra note 22, at arts. 18, 19, 27.
134 Carol Grisanti & Fakhar ur Rehman, Christian Woman Faces Death for Blas-
phemy, MSNBC WORLD BLOG (Nov. 29, 2010, 2:35 PM), http://worldblog.msnbc.
msn.com/_news/2010/11/29/5543912-christian-woman-faces-death-for-blasphemy.
135 Id.
136 U.S. COMM’N ON INT’L RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, ANN. REPORT 115 (2011), available
at http://www.uscirf.gov/images/book%20with%20cover%20for%20web.pdf.
137 Pakistan: Two Persons Murdered After an Anchor Person Proposed the Wide-
spread Lynching of Ahmadi Sect Followers, ASIAN HUM. RTS. COMM’N (Sept. 10,
2008), http://www.humanrights.asia/news/urgent-appeals/AHRC-UAC-203-2008.
138 Id.
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incitements to violence are clear ICCPR Article 20(2) violations that
the Government of Pakistan has wholly ignored.139
Ordinance XX directly undermines Pakistan’s Constitution
and the ICCPR, and gives extremists in Pakistan even more power to
influence legal and civil matters.140  Since 1984, the level of persecu-
tion of religious minorities in Pakistan has steadily increased.  Not
surprisingly, Ahmadi Muslims residing in Pakistan have been called
“the most persecuted Muslim religious group today.”141  For example,
since anti-blasphemy legislation was enacted in 1984, seven hundred
and sixty-four members of the Ahmadiyya Muslim Community have
been charged with blasphemy simply for displaying the Kalima.142  In
addition, thirty-eight Ahmadi Muslims have faced blasphemy charges
for calling the Adhaan,143 four hundred and thirty-four Ahmadi Mus-
lims have been charged for posing as Muslims, one hundred and sixty-
one Ahmadi Muslims have been charged for using Islamic terminology
in public, ninety-three Ahmadi Muslims have been charged with offer-
ing prayers, seven hundred and nineteen Ahmadi Muslims have been
charged for preaching, and the list yet continues.144  In one instance,
roughly sixty thousand members of the Ahmadiyya Muslim Commu-
nity residing in Rabwah, Pakistan were charged for blasphemy under
the 1984 Ordinance XX penal provisions.145  Since 1974 alone, when
Pakistan declared the Ahmadiyya Muslim Community to be a non-
Muslim minority, extremists have murdered nearly three hundred
Ahmadi Muslims on account of their faith.146  Amnesty International
reports that assailants have rarely, if ever, been brought to justice and
that the persecution has only intensified.147  In fact, 2010 proved to be
the bloodiest year in the history of the Ahmadiyya Muslim Community
in Pakistan as ninety-nine Ahmadi Muslims were murdered that
139 ICCPR, supra note 22, at art. 20(2) (“Any advocacy of national, racial or relig-
ious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence
shall be prohibited by law.”).
140 See sources cited supra notes 9-21.
141 Donna E. Arzt, Heroes or Heretics: Religious Dissidents Under Islamic Law, 14
WIS. INT’L L.J. 349, 408 (1996).
142 Summary of the Cases Instituted Against Ahmadis in Pakistan, THEPERSECU-
TION.ORG, http://www.thepersecution.org/facts/summary.html (last visited Feb. 14,
2011) [hereinafter Summary of Cases].
143 Id.; see Paul V. M. Flesher, Official Islam Glossary for Introduction to Religion,
UNIV. OF WYO. (1996), http://uwacadweb.uwyo.edu/religionet/er/islam/iglossry.htm
(describing how the Adhaan is the Muslim call to prayer, announced publicly five
times daily).
144 Summary of Cases, supra note 142.
145 Id.
146 List of Martyres, supra note 109.
147 Amnesty Int’l, supra note 88.
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year.148 On May 28, 2010, during Friday prayer, Tehreek-e-Taliban149
terrorists attacked two Ahmadi Muslim mosques in Lahore, Pakistan,
with semi-automatic weapons, suicide vests, and ball bearings, leaving
86 dead and over 125 injured.150  Though police were warned of the
attacks weeks in advance, they failed to provide any protection to the
attacked members of the Ahmadiyya Muslim Community.151  Instead,
police only arrived several hours after the attack began when the ma-
jority of lives were already lost.152  This incident is also a glaring ex-
ample of Pakistan’s complete disregard for Article 26 of the ICCPR,
which requires governments to offer equal protection under the law to
all of its citizens.153
d. Pakistan’s ICCPR Violations Through the Disenfranchisement of
Religious Minorities
In addition to the aforementioned human rights violations in
Pakistan, the Government of Pakistan has also disenfranchised mil-
lions of its citizens who belong to religious minorities from equal vot-
ing rights.  Pakistan insists it follows a democratic process and allows
free voting for all its citizens, but this claim is simply not true.  While
Pakistan’s Constitution and the ICCPR guarantee equal representa-
tion in public affairs and equal voting rights,154 religious minorities in
148 List of Martyres, supra note 109.
149 See generally Liam Stack, Pakistani Taliban Helped Faisal Shadad, It’s Not on
US List of Terrorists?, THE CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (June 23, 2010), http://www.
csmonitor.com/World/terrorism-security/2010/0623/Pakistani-Taliban-helped-Fai-
sal-Shahzad-it-s-not-on-US-list-of-terrorists (describing how the Tehreek-e-
Taliban (TTP) trained Faisal Shahzad, the convicted attempted Times Square
Bomber, to carry out his attacks and demonstrating how anti-blasphemy legisla-
tion in Pakistan has led to a direct threat to American safety).
150 Press Release, ThePersecution.org, Death Toll Rises to 94 Following Lahore
Terrorist Attacks (May 30, 2010), http://www.thepersecution.org/press/10/pk1005
30.html.
151 Pakistan: Massacre of Minority Ahmadis, HUM. RTS. WATCH (June 1, 2010),
http://www.hrw.org/news/2010/06/01/pakistan-massacre-minority-ahmadis.
152 Id.
153 ICCPR, supra note 22, at art. 26 (“All persons are equal before the law and are
entitled without any discrimination to the equal protection of the law. In this re-
spect, the law shall prohibit any discrimination and guarantee to all persons equal
and effective protection against discrimination on any ground such as race, colour,
sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, prop-
erty, birth or other status.”).
154 See PAK. CONST. art. 36; ICCPR, supra note 22, at art. 25; UDHR, supra note
85, at art. 21(3).
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Pakistan have neither equal representation nor equal voting rights.155
For example, non-Muslims have no representation in the Pakistani
senate and federal cabinet.156  This provision violates Article 25 of the
ICCPR.157  Similarly, no member of a religious minority in Pakistan
can ever rise to the office of President or Prime Minister, as the Presi-
dent and Prime Minister of Pakistan must be a “Muslim” as defined by
the Constitution.158  This discriminatory restriction on minorities from
becoming President or Prime Minister violates Article 25(c) of the
ICCPR, which guarantees equal access to public office.159  Pakistan
has maintained this policy even after its June 2011 ICCPR reservation
retractions.160
Moreover, members of the Ahmadiyya Muslim Community are
further isolated when trying to vote.  Ahmadi Muslims are forced to
make a decision if they choose to vote—either register as a non-Mus-
lim or sign a document declaring the founder of their community,
Mirza Ghulam Ahmad, to be an apostate and a liar.161  In other words,
members of the Ahmadiyya Muslim Community must either denounce
their faith, denounce their Community’s Founder, or be forbidden from
voting.  The July-December 2010 UN International Religious Freedom
Report on Pakistan explains:
The government [of Pakistan] designated religious affili-
ation on passports and requested religious information
in national identity card applications.  A citizen must
have a national identity card to vote.  Those wishing to
be listed as Muslims must swear their belief that the
Prophet Muhammad is the final prophet and denounce
the Ahmadiyya movement’s founder [Mirza Ghulam
Ahmad] as a false prophet and his followers as non-Mus-
lims, a provision designed to discriminate against
155 Amjad Mahmood Khan, Persecution of the Ahmadiyya Community in Pakistan:
An Analysis Under International Law and International Relations, 16 HARV. HUM.
RTS. J. 217, 226 n.33 (2003).
156 Id.
157 ICCPR, supra note 22, at art. 25 (guaranteeing equal participation in public
affairs and the right to vote).
158 PAK. CONST. art. 41(2) (“A person shall not be qualified for election as Presi-
dent unless he is a Muslim of not less than forty-five years of age and is qualified
to be elected as member of the National Assembly.”).
159 ICCPR, supra note 22, art. 25(c) (“Every citizen shall have the right and the
opportunity, without any of the distinctions mentioned in article 2 and without
unreasonable restrictions:
(c) To have access, on general terms of equality, to public service in his country.”).
160 See Pakistan Withdraws Reservations, supra note 103.
161 Khan, supra note 155, at 226 n.33.
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Ahmadis.  As a result Ahmadis continued to boycott
elections.162
This unconstitutional requirement has disenfranchised Pakistan’s
roughly 4 million Ahmadi Muslims from the voting process.163  For re-
ligious minorities in general, a separate voting electorate functioned
from 1978 until President Pervez Musharraf issued an executive order
calling for its elimination in 2002.164  Under pressure from clerics,
however, President Musharraf issued Executive Order 15 just a few
months later, partially undoing his previous order.165  Executive Or-
der 15 exclusively targeted Ahmadi Muslims on account of their faith
and placed them into the same discriminatory predicament as during
the separate electorate.166  Thus, since 2002, members of the
Ahmadiyya Muslim Community in Pakistan are the only demographic
disenfranchised from voting in Pakistan.  Once again, this policy di-
rectly violates the ICCPR Article 25(a), which guarantees every citizen
the right to take part in public affairs.167  This policy also violates the
ICCPR Article 25(b), which guarantees equal suffrage and secret bal-
loting.168  If Ahmadi Muslims must reveal their affiliation when vot-
ing, then they can vote neither equally nor in secret—and thus, have
no representation on matters of public importance.  Until Pakistan is
held accountable under the ICCPR, this human rights violation will
continue to become more destructive.
e. Pakistan’s ICCPR Violations Perpetuate National Extremism
Pakistan’s current President Asif Ali Zardari has made inter-
national promises to champion peace and human rights.169  Pakistan
162 U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RTS., AND LABOR, INT’L
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM REP.: PAKISTAN 6 (Sep. 13, 2011), available at http://www.
state.gov/documents/organization/171759.pdf [hereinafter RELIGIOUS FREEDOM
REPORT: PAKISTAN].
163 See Khan, supra note 155, at 218.
164 N. Mahmood Ahmad & Amjad Mahmood Khan, ‘Apartheid’ in Pakistan, WASH.
POST (Jan. 19, 2011), http://newsweek.washingtonpost.com/onfaith/guestvoices/
2011/01/apartheid_in_pakistan.html.
165 PAK. PENAL CODE §§ 7B, 7C (made part of Penal Code by Chief Executive’s
Order No. 15 (1984), THE GAZETTE OF PAKISTAN EXTRAORDINARY, June 17, 2002).
166 Ahmad & Khan, supra note 164.
167 ICCPR, supra note 22, at art. 25(a).
168 Id. art. 25(b).
169 “High ideals of the United Nations have inspired our vision of the global soci-
ety. A global society that is based on: Peace and justice; Freedom and human
rights; Equality and equal opportunity; Freedom from want and hunger; Tolerance
and harmony; A global society; that celebrates its unity in diversity; That believes
in sovereign equality of nations, large or small; That promotes, truth and reconcili-
ation. . . On behalf of the people of Pakistan I assure you of our cooperation to
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in the Zardari era, however, has only upheld the discriminatory 1974
amendment and 1984 anti-blasphemy legislation.  Under Zardari’s re-
gime in 2009, Pakistan charged at least 74 members of the Ahmadiyya
Muslim Community under section 295 of the penal code, and to this
day has still detained many of these individuals behind bars.170  More-
over, according to the watchdog organization South Asia Terrorism
Portal (“SATP”), sectarian violence continues to increase in Pakistan.
SATP reports that terrorists in Pakistan killed over 1500 civilians in
2007.171  In 2008, 2155 civilians were murdered.172  The year 2009 re-
corded another increase as over 2300 civilians were killed in sectarian
violence.173  In 2010, civilian deaths decreased to 1796.174  This de-
crease seems to be an anomaly, unfortunately, because SATP reports
that as of December 25, 2011, 2545 civilians have been killed in Paki-
stan because of terrorist violence.175  These numbers do not account
the thousands killed as youths recruited to militancy, terrorists in sui-
cide bombings, and military personnel in terrorist attacks.176
As a direct result of Pakistan’s anti-blasphemy laws, Paki-
stan’s minority Christian population continues to suffer intense perse-
cution as well.  The US State Department reports, “[d]uring the 2009
violence in the village of Gojra, eight Christians were killed and 18
injured, and two churches and about 75 houses burned, following an
accusation that Christians had desecrated the Koran.”177  Likewise, in
response to a Florida pastor’s March 2011 Qur’an burning, several
churches in Pakistan were attacked.178  Numerous Christians accused
of blasphemy have been murdered, even under police protection.  For
example, Qamar David, a Christian who was sentenced to 25 years in
2006 for allegedly blasphemous text messages, was found dead in his
Karachi jail in March 2011.179  In July 2010, two Christian brothers
fashion a safer and better world; A world in which all children, - yours and mine-
live in peace and harmony.” Asif Ali Zardari, President, Pak., Speech to United
Nation General Assembly (Sep. 25, 2009), available at http://www.ihro.org.pk/
zardari_speech_un.html.
170 PERSECUTION OF AHMADIS IN PAKISTAN DURING THE YEAR 2009: A SUMMARY,
THEPERSECUTION.ORG  98, http://www.thepersecution.org/dl/2009/annual_report
2009.pdf (last visited Oct. 4, 2011) [hereinafter PERSECUTION OF AHMADIS].
171 Fatalities in Terrorist Violence in Pakistan 2003-2011, http://www.satp.org/
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were shot dead on the footsteps of a Faisalabad courthouse; each origi-
nally summoned on the charge of alleged blasphemy.180  Even those
acquitted of blasphemy are subject to vigilante justice. Muhammad
Imran was released from an April 2009 blasphemy charge—for a lack
of evidence no less—but was still gunned down in March 2011.181
Note that, with the exception of the 2009 Gojra violence, which took
place after Pakistan only signed the ICCPR, each of the aforemen-
tioned murders occurred after Pakistan signed and ratified the
ICCPR.
Pakistan’s Hindu population has not faced much better than
Pakistan’s Christian population. The US State Department reports
that 23 Hindu children were kidnapped between January 2008 and
December 2010.182  Hindu and Christian women, including minors,
are particularly vulnerable to rape and forced conversion to Islam.183
Some estimates record that up to 25 Hindu women in Pakistan are
forcibly converted to Islam every month.184  Such behavior violates
any number of ICCPR Articles.
Still, in February 2010, Pakistan’s Minister of Minority Affairs,
the late Shahbaz Bhatti, claimed he expected changes to the current
anti-blasphemy legislation by the end of 2010.185  The potential
changes would obligate judges to investigate blasphemy cases before
they are registered, and mete out similar punishments to those who
concoct false accusations.186  While such an amendment may theoreti-
cally work to help decrease abuse of anti-blasphemy legislation, it fails
to recognize the principle that anti-blasphemy legislation itself is in
violation of Pakistan’s own Constitution and the ICCPR.  That fact
notwithstanding, however, such a change is nowhere to be found in
Pakistan’s legislative process even two years later.  On the contrary,
Babar Awan, Pakistan’s then Law Minister and close aide of President
Zardari, categorically rejected any efforts to repeal anti-blasphemy
legislation, declaring, “in my presence as the Law Minister, no one
should think of finishing this [anti-blasphemy] law.”187  To properly
contextualize, Awan’s comment was in response to appeals to grant
180 Id.
181 Id.
182 Id. at 114.
183 Id.
184 Id. at 114-15.
185 Shaun Tandon, Pakistan Minister Sees Blasphemy Law Revision This Year,
AGENCE FRANCE-PRESSE (Feb. 7, 2010), http://www.google.com/hostednews/afp/ar-
ticle/ALeqM5gN_fU6rinxd4J-egRTpxlQrY5sdA.
186 Id.
187 “No One Should Think of Finishing Blasphemy Law in My Presence”: Pak Law
Minister, ONEINDIA NEWS (Nov. 26, 2010), http://news.oneindia.in/2010/11/26/no
one-should-think-of-finishing-blasphemy-law-in-mypresen.html.
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Christian Pakistani Asia Bibi amnesty for her conviction of alleged
blasphemy.188  Likewise, Pakistan’s Prime Minister Gilani, stated on
January 8, 2011, “I have already clarified and our religious affairs
minister has also said that we have no intentions to amend this
law.”189  Most depressing, however, is that Shabazz Bhatti, Pakistan’s
only Christian federal minister, was murdered at the hands of extrem-
ists on March 2, 2011, specifically because he sought to repeal Paki-
stan’s anti-blasphemy laws.190
Furthermore, Bhatti was not the first politician to be assassi-
nated due to attempts to repeal Pakistan’s anti-blasphemy laws.  On
January 3, 2011, Punjab Province Governor Salman Taseer was also
assassinated at the hands of one of his bodyguards, Mumtaz Qadri,
who did so because Governor Taseer wanted to repeal Pakistan’s anti-
blasphemy laws.191  In a tweet hours before his murder, Taseer stated,
“I was under huge pressure sure 2 cow down b4 rightest [sic] pressure
on blasphemy. Refused. Even if I’m the last man standing.”192  In cele-
bration of Taseer’s assassination, 500 clerics in Pakistan declared his
death a victory for the country, lawyers threw rose petals on the
assassin, and countless refused to offer Taseer’s funeral prayers.193
On January 9th, 2011, over 50,000 people rallied in support of anti-
blasphemy legislation—demonstrating how these discriminatory laws
have gained dramatic strength since their implementation.194  In fact,
Judge Pervez Ali Shah, who presided over Mumtaz Qadri’s criminal
case and delivered a death penalty verdict, has gone into hiding after
receiving multiple death threats.195
Furthermore, the Government of Pakistan is often in complete
denial that any discrimination, much less persecution, exists.  For ex-
188 Id.
189 Massive Karachi Rally in Support of Blasphemy Law, BBC NEWS (Jan. 10,
2011), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-12149011 [hereinafter Massive
Karachi Rally].
190 Karin Brulliard & Shaiq Hussain, Shahbaz Bhatti, Pakistan’s Sole Christian
Minister, Is Assassinated in Islamabad, WASH. POST (Mar. 2, 2011), http://www.
washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2011/03/01/AR2011030101394.html.
191 Punjab Governor Salman Taseer Assassinated in Islamabad, BBC NEWS (Jan.
4, 2011), http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/world-south-asia-12111831.
192 Saba Imtiaz, Salmaan Taseer, Last Man Standing, FOREIGN POL. (Jan. 5,
2011), http://afpak.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2011/01/05/salmaan_taseer_last_man_
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193 U.S. COMM’N ON INT’L RELIGIOUS FREEDOM, supra note 114, at 112.
194 Massive Karachi Rally, supra note 189.
195 Farooq Naeem, Sympathy for an Assassin: The Worrisome Protests in Paki-
stan, TIME (Oct. 9, 2011), http://www.time.com/time/world/article/0,8599,2096500,
00.html.
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ample, Nadeem Kiani, spokesman for the Embassy of Pakistan in
Washington D.C. stated to the Los Angeles Times on October 12, 2009,
[t]he Ahmadi beliefs are in absolute contravention to
Muslim beliefs, but everyone has equal rights of worship
in Pakistan. . .There are some people who try to incite
sectarian violence from time to time to carry out their
own agendas but as far as the government and 99% of
the general public are concerned, there are no problems
with Ahmadis.196
On the contrary, a November 23, 2010 Human Rights Watch report
categorically rejects Kiani’s statement, and particularly mentions the
denial tactic in which Kiani engages:
The Punjab [Pakistan] provincial government is either in
denial about threats to minorities or is following a policy
of willful discrimination. . .Provincial law enforcement
authorities need to put aside their prejudices and protect
religious minorities who are clearly in serious danger
from both the Taliban and sectarian militant groups his-
torically supported by the state.197
Likewise, an October 11, 2005 Amnesty International report demon-
strates that persecution of religious minorities in Pakistan is not a
rogue phenomenon, but is in fact a state sanctioned norm.
Police investigations of previous targeted killings of
Ahmadi [Muslims] in Pakistan have been slow or have
not taken place at all.  In many cases the perpetrators
have not been brought to justice.  Amnesty International
believes that the government’s consistent failure to in-
vestigate attacks and killings of members of religious mi-
norities fails to discourage further human rights abuses
against such groups.198
The 2010 UN International Religious Freedom Report on Pakistan
adds that, “[s]acred books for religious minorities, except Ahmadis,
were freely imported,”199 further demonstrating the Government’s
targeted discrimination against Ahmadi Muslims.  The report also
adds,
196 David Kelly, In a Chino Mosque, Ahmadis Can Worship Freely, L.A. TIMES
(Oct. 12, 2009), http://articles.latimes.com/2009/oct/12/local/me-beliefs12/2.
197 Pakistan: Repeal Blasphemy Law, HUM. RTS. WATCH (Nov. 23, 2010), http://
www.hrw.org/en/news/2010/11/22/pakistan-repeal-blasphemy-law (emphasis
added).
198 Amnesty Int’l, supra note 88.
199 Religious Freedom Report: Pakistan, supra note 162, at 13.
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[t]he constitution provides for the right to establish
places of worship and train clergy, but in practice these
rights were restricted for Ahmadis.  Authorities contin-
ued to conduct surveillance on Ahmadis, and several
Ahmadiyya mosques reportedly were closed or confis-
cated; others reportedly were desecrated or their con-
struction stopped.200
While the ICCPR Article 27 ensures minorities are protected from
such discrimination,201 Pakistan has only promoted state sanctioned
persecution, empowering extremists to treat minorities in Pakistan as
less than equal citizens.
The ICCPR Article 21 specifically reserves the right to peacea-
bly assemble.202  Members of the Ahmadiyya Muslim Community in
Pakistan, however, are forbidden from the right to peaceful assembly,
as assembly would mean propagation, and thus in violation of Ordi-
nance XX.203  Pakistan has denied Ahmadi Muslims this right since
1983.204  Article 21 only restricts the right to assembly for reasons of
national security,205 but that restriction cannot fairly apply to Ahmadi
Muslims.206  The Ahmadiyya Muslim Community in Pakistan held na-
tional conferences annually from 1948207 to 1984 when General Zia
forbade them,208 all without a single act of violence or disturbance of
the peace.  In fact, since the Ahmadiyya Muslim Community began
holding conferences in 1891 in India, it has held literally thousands of
conferences worldwide, with attendance exceeding 200,000 members
at times, all without a single act of violence on record.209  The
Ahmadiyya Muslim Community uses these public conferences to
champion peace, enhance spirituality, and engage in humanitarian
200 Id. at 12.
201 See ICCPR, supra note 22, at art. 27.
202 See id. art. 21.
203 PAK. PENAL CODE § 298C (made part of Penal Code by Presidential Ordinance
No. 20 (1984), THE GAZETTE OF PAKISTAN EXTRAORDINARY, Apr. 26, 1984).
204 See U.S. DEP’T STATE, INT’L RELIGIOUS FREEDOM REP. 2010 (Nov. 17, 2010),
http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2010/148800.htm.
205 See ICCPR, supra note 22, at art. 21.
206 Khan, supra note 155, at 234.
207 See Human Right Violations Suffered by Ahmadis in Pakistan: A Brief,
THEPERSECUTION.ORG, http://www.thepersecution.org/brief.html (last visited Sept.
30, 2011).
208 See Newsreport November, 2006: Vicious Application of the Blasphemy Law,
THEPERSECUTION.ORG, http://www.thepersecution.org/nr/2006/november.html
(last visited Sept. 30, 2011).
209 See Annual Conference, AL ISLAM, http://www.alislam.org/library/history/
ahmadiyya/69.html (last visited Sept. 30, 2011).
2011] PAKISTAN’S FAILED COMMITMENT 33
services.210  Pakistan’s state policy to restrict Ahmadi Muslims from
the right to freedom of assembly is in clear violation of ICCPR Article
21.
On the other hand, Pakistan unrestrictedly allows groups like
the Khatame Nabuwwat Party to hold regular conferences, with the
specific aim to disparage and incite hatred against the Ahmadiyya
Muslim Community.211  These conferences promote the extremist ide-
ology that Ahmadi Muslims are wajibul qatl, i.e. liable to death, and
that “the streets need to be cleansed of Ahmadi Muslims [sic].”212
Chaudri Muhammad Iqbal, former President of the Khatme Nabuw-
wat movement declared in 2009, “[t]o dispatch [i.e. kill and send] a
Qadiani to hell is the religious duty of every Muslim.”213  While the
ICCPR Article 20(2) expressly forbids advocacy for the aforementioned
violent purposes,214 the Government of Pakistan has done nothing to
prevent these conferences from taking place, or to hold those who in-
cite violence accountable.  The results have been devastating.  For ex-
ample, surrounding the May 28th, 2010 Lahore attack that killed 86
members of the Ahmadiyya Muslim Community, Human Rights
Watch reported that “[t]he anti-Ahmadiyya campaign has intensified
in the past year, exemplified by the government allowing groups to
place banners seeking the death of “Qadianis” (a derogatory term for
Ahmadi [Muslims]) on the main thoroughfares of Lahore.”215  Like-
wise, the Human Rights Commission of Pakistan, an independent
NGO, reported that it “repeatedly brought [the Taliban’s] threats [of
attack] to the notice of Punjab Chief Minister Shahbaz Sharif, the pro-
vincial government, and the police controlled by the provincial author-
ities, asking for enhanced security for Ahmadiyya mosques.”216  Not
only did the Government completely fail to provide any protection,
Zaeem Qadri, an advisor to Punjab Chief Minister Shahbaz Sharif, ad-
mitted, “the provincial Government had failed to remove threatening
banners from the city’s thoroughfares in order to prevent ‘adverse re-
action against the government’ by the groups responsible.”217  In short,
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212 Id.
213 PERSECUTION OF AHMADIS, supra note 170, at 1.
214 See ICCPR, supra note 22, at art. 20.
215 See Pakistan: Massacre of Minority Ahmadis, supra note 151.
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the Government of Pakistan and the Pakistani Court system permit-
ted public banners in Lahore, calling for the murder of all Ahmadi
Muslims, specifically to avoid a Taliban attack on the government.
That the Government of Pakistan allowed such banners to be raised in
the first place is a direct contravention of ICCPR Article 20(2), which
forbids religious hatred and incitement to violence and
discrimination.218
f. Pakistan’s ICCPR Violations Perpetuate International Extremism
In addition to causing increasingly violent internal problems,
Pakistan’s anti-blasphemy laws have helped extremists amplify their
influence on an international scale. For example, the Christian Science
Monitor reports that the May 2010 failed Times Square bomber, Faisal
Shahzad, received his training from the Pakistani Tehreek-e-
Taliban.219  This is the same Taliban group that killed 86 members of
the Ahmadiyya Muslim Community on May 28th, 2010.220  Likewise,
in November 2010, Mohamed Osman Mohamud was arrested in Port-
land, Oregon, for an attempted bombing.221  He admits his training
came from Internet websites teaching destruction of the west and all
‘un-Islamic’ regimes, exactly reflecting the teachings Maududi pro-
moted to help pass anti-blasphemy legislation in Pakistan.222  Moreo-
ver, the five Virginian youth arrested in Pakistan in 2009 traveled to
Pakistan from America to receive terrorism training from the
Taliban.223  The BBC reports on December 8, 2010 that in the United
Kingdom, the Khatam un Nabuwat Movement handed out leaflets
calling for the murder of all members of the Ahmadiyya Muslim Com-
munity on account of their blasphemous faith.224  This is the same po-
litical movement calling for the death of the Christian Pakistani
218 See ICCPR, supra note 22, at art. 20(2) (“Any advocacy of national, racial or
religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination, hostility or violence
shall be prohibited by law.”).
219 See Stack, supra note 149.
220 Pakistan: Massacre of Minority Ahmadis, supra note 151.
221 See Brad Knickerbocker, Mohamed Osman Mohamud: The Somali Teen Who
Wanted to Bomb Portland, THE CHRISTIAN SCI. MONITOR (Nov. 28, 2010), http://
www.csmonitor.com/USA/2010/1128/Mohamed-Osman-Mohamud-The-Somali-
teen-who-wanted-to-bomb-Portland; see also GRARE, supra note 40.
222 See ABC Interview Regarding Extremist Websites, YOUTUBE (Dec. 1, 2010),
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=hYMEs6GSUlM.
223 See Frank Liao, Five US Students Arrested in Pakistan on Terrorism Charges,
NOWPUBLIC (Dec. 11, 2009), http://www.nowpublic.com/world/five-us-students-ar-
rested-pakistan-terrorism-charges.
224 See Ahmadiyaa ‘Targeted by Hate Campaign’, BBC NEWS (Dec. 8, 2010), http://
www.bbc.co.uk/news/uk-11947734.
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woman, Asia Bibi, for her alleged blasphemy.225  Pakistan’s support of
anti-blasphemy legislation has created a society that is increasingly
influencing people around the world with extremist ideologies.
This influence of extremist ideologies does not extend merely to
fringe groups, but also to numerous governments.  In 1999 Pakistan
and the Organization of the Islamic Conference (“OIC”) introduced an
anti-blasphemy measure (“the resolution”) to the United Nations that
“stresses the need to effectively combat defamation of all religions and
incitement to religious hatred, against Islam and Muslims in particu-
lar.”226  This resolution passed every year for over a decade before it
was finally defeated in 2011.227  Before the resolution was ultimately
rejected, Pakistan touted it as a means to champion diversity and pro-
mote harmony.228  This is, however, the exact type of law used to per-
secute Pakistan’s religious minorities.  For example, Section 295-C of
Pakistan’s Ordinance XX issues the death penalty for anyone who, “by
words, either spoken or written, or by visible representation, or by any
imputation, innuendo, or insinuation, directly or indirectly, defiles the
sacred name of the Holy Prophet Muhammad.”229  The resolution’s
proposed purpose is “combat defamation. . .against Islam and Muslims
in particular.”230  More than just a similarity, Pakistani Christian
Asia Bibi is on death row, and countless more are incarcerated, for the
precise allegation that they defamed Islam and Muslims.231
Indonesia, a nation President Obama complimented as one
that has the “spirit of religious tolerance. . .enshrined in [its] Constitu-
tion, and that [spirit] remains one of [Indonesia’s] defining and inspir-
ing characteristics,”232 has recently enforced anti-blasphemy laws to
225 Grisanti & ur Rehman, supra note 134.
226 Betsy Pisik, U.S. Fights Islamic Anti-Defamation Push, THE WASH. TIMES
(Sept. 2, 2008), http://www.washingtontimes.com/news/2008/sep/02/us-fights-is-
lamic-anti-defamation-push/.
227 See News Release, Assyrian Int’l News Agency, An Anti-Blasphemy Measure
Laid to Rest – AINA (Apr. 1, 2011), http://www.uscirf.gov/news-room/uscirf-in-the-
news/3585.html.
228 See id. (“Speaking for the OIC, Pakistan typically introduced these resolutions,
arguing in words calculated to appeal to Western liberals: “Unrestricted and disre-
spectful freedom of opinion creates hatred and is contrary to the spirit of peaceful
dialogue and promotion of multiculturalism.”).
229 PAK. PENAL CODE § 295C (made part of Penal Code by Presidential Ordinance
No. 20 (1984), THE GAZETTE OF PAKISTAN EXTRAORDINARY, Apr. 26, 1984).
230 See Pisik, supra note 226.
231 See Grisanti & ur Rehman, supra note 134.
232 Barack Obama, President, U.S., Remarks in Indon. (Nov. 9, 2010), http://
blogs.wsj.com/washwire/2010/11/09/full-text-obamas-prepared-remarks-in-indone-
sia/.
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restrict religious freedom for Indonesian Ahmadi Muslims.233  As a re-
sult, restrictions on religious freedom have increasingly allowed vio-
lence against Ahmadi Muslims, because of their faith.234  In addition,
the US State Department reports that Indonesian government officials
are calling to ban Ahmadi Muslims from Indonesia, and turning a
blind eye to dozens of Ahmadi Muslims mosques that have been ille-
gally closed and destroyed.235  Like Pakistan, Indonesia has signed
and ratified the ICCPR, demonstrating the powerfully destructive
abilities of anti-blasphemy legislation.236
Likewise, the international community cannot ignore the dan-
gerous precedent that will be set if Pakistan is allowed to uphold its
current discriminatory legislation yet remain an ICCPR ratified mem-
ber.  Nations may then point to a discriminatory Pakistan as an
ICCPR member nation, and justify committing similar atrocities with-
out fear of reprisal.  Even now, what is to prevent Indonesia from pro-
posing this argument to justify its discriminatory laws?  The domino
233 U.S. DEP’T OF STATE, BUREAU OF DEMOCRACY, HUMAN RTS., AND LABOR, INT’L
RELIGIOUS FREEDOM REP.: INDONESIA, http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/irf/2008/1084
07.htm (last visited Sept. 28, 2011) [hereinafter RELIGIOUS FREEDOM REP.: INDONE-
SIA] (“On June 9, 2008, the Government announced a joint ministerial decree
freezing the activities of the Ahmadiyya Qadiyani (Ahmadiyya) and prohibiting
vigilantism against the group. The decree was short of an outright ban for which
hardline groups and a government-appointed body, the Coordinating Board for
Monitoring Mystical Beliefs in Society (Bakor Pakem), were strongly advocating.
The decree was signed by the Attorney General’s Office, the Ministry of Religion,
and the Ministry of Home Affairs. The Minister of Religious Affairs stated that
violations of the ban on proselytizing would result in a maximum 5-year jail sen-
tence under charges of blasphemy. . . Prior to the government decree, Bakor
Pakem issued a recommendation to the Government to dissolve the Ahmadiyya.
The April 16, 2008, recommendation declared the group heretical and deviant, cit-
ing a 1965 presidential instruction on the ‘prevention of misuse and disgrace of
religion.’”).
234 Phillip Shishkin, Intolerant Indonesia: In Java, Muslim Hardliners Target
‘Apostates’, WORLD NEWS (Feb. 13, 2011), http://www.thedailybeast.com/news-
week/2011/02/13/intolerant-indonesia.html.
235 RELIGIOUS FREEDOM REP.: INDONESIA, supra note 233 (“There were a number of
reports of societal abuses or discrimination based on religious affiliation, belief, or
practice. Some groups used violence and intimidation to force at least 12 churches
and 21 Ahmadiyya mosques to close. Several churches and Ahmadiyya mosques
remained closed after mobs forcibly shut them down in previous years. Some Mus-
lim organizations and government officials called for the dissolution of the
Ahmadiyya, resulting in some violence and discrimination against its followers.
Some perpetrators of violence were undergoing trials during the reporting period.
However, many perpetrators of past abuse against religious minorities were not
brought to justice.”).
236 STATUS PAGE FOR ICCPR, supra note 66. Indonesia ratified the ICCPR on 23
February 2006.
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effect has the potential to compromise the very purpose of the ICCPR,
and expose minorities worldwide to discriminatory legislation.  There-
fore, these human rights violations and apathetic ICCPR compliance
must be dealt with immediately.
PART IV: SOLUTIONS TO ENCOURAGE PAKISTAN TO COMPLY
WITH THE ICCPR
a. A Strong Platform Exists to Ignite Reformation
Since Pakistan’s anti-Ahmadi and anti-blasphemy legislation
was enacted in 1984 and 1986, respectively,237 an entire generation of
Pakistanis have been raised with the belief that the ‘might is right’
approach to public policy is constitutional.  Obviously, no simple solu-
tion exists to return Pakistan to its noble founding principles of equal-
ity and freedom.  Pakistan has signed and ratified the ICCPR,
however, and this is a significant platform upon which Pakistan can
advance towards restoring human rights.  Likewise, that Pakistan has
recently recanted the majority of its reservations also indicates at
least a peripheral willingness to comply with its international obliga-
tions.  This process must continue.
The first step to ensure this process continues is through inter-
national accountability.  Herein, however, lies the problem.  That Pa-
kistan is in blatant violation of the ICCPR should be an international
outrage—but no such mass outrage exists.  Unfortunately, this inter-
national apathetic approach is nothing new. The world has largely re-
mained historically silent, even though Pakistan has violated minority
rights for at least the past 36 years (since it passed the Second Amend-
ment to its Constitution).238  To date, the US House of Representatives
has passed only two resolutions, one in 1986 and the other 2002, con-
demning Pakistan’s anti-blasphemy legislation.239  In similar fashion,
the United Nations passed Resolution 1985/21 in 1986, also to specifi-
cally condemn Ordinance XX.240  Three resolutions in the span of
nearly four decades, the most recent of which was a decade ago, cannot
be expected to effectuate substantive change. For Pakistan to be held
accountable under the ICCPR, the international community must take
active measures to address Pakistan’s systematic human rights viola-
tions and ICCPR noncompliance. These appropriate measures include
enforcement of Article 41 of the ICCPR.
237 Khan, supra note 155, at 226-27.
238 PAK. CONST. amend. II.
239 H.R. Res. 348, 107th Cong. (2002); H.R. Res. 379, 96th Cong. (1986).
240 See Khan, supra note 155, at 235.
38 RICHMOND JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LAW & BUSINESS [Vol. 11:1
b. Prime Time for ICCPR Article 41 Action Against Pakistan
Article 41 of the ICCPR permits ICCPR member nations to file
complaints against other member nations for human rights viola-
tions.241  The nation against whom the complaint is filed then has
three months to provide an “explanation, or any other statement in
writing clarifying the matter which should include, to the extent possi-
ble and pertinent, reference to domestic procedures and remedies
taken, pending, or available in the matter.”242  Failure to comply with
this procedural requirement results in the matter being referred to a
UN Commission, which conducts an even more thorough investiga-
tion.243  ICCPR Article 41 provisions are only applicable, however,
when the offending nation recognizes Article 40—i.e. accepts the com-
petency of the United Nations Human Rights Committee to receive
complaints244—and ten ICCPR ratified member states who also recog-
nize Article 40 file declarations under Article 41, paragraph 1.245  To
date, no nation has filed Article 41 complaints against Pakistan, even
though 166246 nations have signed and ratified the ICCPR, and recog-
nize Article 40.  It stands to reason, therefore, that at least ten nations
can join together to address Pakistan’s ICCPR violations.  Through in-
ternational EU pressure, Pakistan retracted its ICCPR reserva-
tions.247  Likewise, through joint international pressure via Article 41
activation, Pakistan can be made to retract both anti-blasphemy legis-
lation and voting restrictions on its religious minorities.
c. The United States and Pakistan Must Unite Against Extremism
When Former President George W. Bush was in office, he made
clear that Pakistan is a close American ally in the war on extrem-
ism.248  In fact, this alliance first developed under President Reagan’s
administration during the proxy war in Afghanistan, even before Paki-
stan’s anti-blasphemy laws were enacted.249 While the war against ex-
241 ICCPR, supra note 22, at art. 41.
242 Id. art. 41(a).
243 Id. art. 41(b).
244 Pakistan Withdraws Reservations, supra note 103.
245 Id. art. 41(2).
246 The Right to Information, FONDATION HIRONDELLE, http://www.hirondelle.org/
the-right-to-information/?lang=en (last visited Sept. 30, 2011).
247 Pakistan Withdraws Reservations, supra note 103.
248 Bush Names Pakistan ‘Major Ally’, BBC NEWS (June 17, 2004), http://news.
bbc.co.uk/2/hi/3814013.stm.
249 Adrian Levy & Cathy Scott-Clark, The Man Who Knew Too Much, THE GUARD-
IAN (Oct. 13, 2007), http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2007/oct/13/usa.pakistan
(quoting Richard Barlow, a CIA expert on Pakistan’s nuclear secrets, who served
under the Reagan administration. He observes, “. . .Pakistan had, within days of
Reagan’s inauguration in 1981, gone from being an outcast nation that had out-
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tremism is admittedly a different phenomenon, the success of the
proxy war demonstrates the power of a unified front against a common
enemy.  The common enemy in this case is extremism, supported and
promoted by anti-blasphemy legislation.  As Pakistan’s strongest ally
in the west and a fellow ICCPR ratified member, the United States
must invest in Pakistan’s public policy by assertively encouraging Pa-
kistan to repeal its anti-blasphemy legislation in favor of the ICCPR.
This process can appropriate itself through numerous forms, including
diplomacy, conditional aid, educational grants, and federal resolu-
tions.  In November 2010, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton men-
tioned Pakistan’s numerous human rights violations during a lecture
on religious persecution.250  Likewise, the State Department’s 2011
annual report on Pakistan mentions Ahmadi Muslims by name at
least 101 times.251  Both examples demonstrate our government’s keen
awareness of these issues, and the need to act quickly to rectify them.
On July 29, 2011, the U.S. House of Representatives passed the
South Central Asia Religious Freedom Act, H.R. 440, to promote relig-
ious freedom in South Asia, including Pakistan.252  In addition to pro-
moting religious freedom and combating religious violence, H.R. 440
authorizes the U.S. Government to work with foreign governments to
address inherently discriminatory laws.253  This awareness and proac-
tive legislation must be consistent to protect the rights of Pakistan’s
religious minorities, and is a positive step forward in doing so.
d. Encourage Pakistan to Sign The First Optional Protocol of the
ICCPR
Pakistan has, to date, abstained from signing the First Op-
tional Protocol of the ICCPR.254  As a result, individuals in Pakistan
who have exhausted all domestic legal relief mechanisms but still face
human rights violations are left without recourse to combat Pakistan’s
illegal apparatus of state sanctioned persecution. In fact, Ahmadi
Muslims appealed Pakistan’s anti-blasphemy laws up to Pakistan’s
Supreme Court in 1993, without success.255  Likewise, President
raged the west by hanging Bhutto to a major US ally in the proxy war in Afghani-
stan.”) (emphasis added).
250 Hillary Clinton, Hillary Clinton About Anti Ahmadiyya Laws Persecution in
Pakistan Islam Ahmadiyya, YOUTUBE (Nov. 21, 2010), http://www.youtube.com/
watch?v=_knTT6BTYqA&p=4C3F11DC3301061C.
251 Ahmad & Khan, supra note 164.
252 South Central Asia Religious Freedom Act, H.R. 440, 112th Cong. (2011).
253 See id. § 3.
254 STATUS PAGE FOR OPTIONAL PROTOCOL, supra note 101.
255 Zaheeruddin v. State, 26 S.C.M.R. (S.Ct.) 1718 (1993) (Pak.) (holding that
Ahmadi Muslims do not qualify for religious freedom protection because they are
outside the fold of Islam, and as apostates, do not have the right to engage in
40 RICHMOND JOURNAL OF GLOBAL LAW & BUSINESS [Vol. 11:1
Musharraf’s Executive Order 15 in 2002 further cemented Pakistan’s
targeted persecution of the Ahmadiyya Muslim Community.256  Since
1974, Ahmadi Muslims have been completely disenfranchised from
voting, and since 2002, are Pakistan’s only disenfranchised commu-
nity. Pakistan recanted its reservations under pressure from the Euro-
pean Union.257  A similar strategy may be applied to oblige Pakistan to
sign the First Optional Protocol of the ICCPR.  By obliging Pakistan to
sign the First Optional Protocol of the ICCPR, the international com-
munity will afford persecuted religious minorities in Pakistan (for the
first time in nearly two decades) an affirmative venue to challenge Pa-
kistan’s illegal apparatus of state sanctioned persecution. As of now,
no such option exists to mitigate this persecution.
e. International Proactive Support of Moderation
Finally, moderation is the ultimate antidote to extremism.  A
moderate voice within the worldwide Muslim community that can lead
by example will offer those prone to extremist ideology a clear alterna-
tive to extremism.  In this battle of ideologies, international public
support of anti-extremist platforms, along with active protection of
such platforms and its adherents is crucial to promote moderation.
This process has already begun in several nations. For example, Ca-
nada’s Prime Minister Stephen Harper stated in a July 2008 address,
Ahmadi [Muslims] are renowned for their devotion to
peace, universal brotherhood and submission to the will
of God—the core principles of true Islam. . .They are also
renowned for working together to serve the greater good
through social, health and education initiatives, as well
as mosque projects like this one.  And wherever they live
in the world, Ahmadi [Muslims] are renowned for partic-
ipating in the larger community and peacefully co-ex-
Islamic behavior. Just as Coca Cola has the right to protect their product trade-
mark, Pakistan has the right to protect the usage of Islamic terms and behaviors,
and reserve them exclusively for Muslims. Therefore, Ordinance XX anti-blas-
phemy laws were not only Constitutional, but necessary to protect Islam and pre-
serve the peace by not offending Pakistan’s Sunni Muslim majority population);
see also Amjad Mahmood Khan, Misuse and Abuse of Legal Argument by Analogy
in Transjudicial Communication: The Case of Zaheeruddin v. State, 10 RICH. J.
GLOBAL L. & BUS. 497 (2011). See generally Tayyab Mahmud, Freedom of Religion
and Religious Minorities in Pakistan: a Study of Judicial Practice, 19 FORDHAM
INT’L L.J. 40 (1995) (providing a detailed scholarly analysis of Zaheeruddin).
256 PAK. PENAL CODE §§ 7B, 7C (made part of Penal Code by Presidential Ordi-
nance No. 15 (1984), THE GAZETTE OF PAKISTAN EXTRAORDINARY, June 17, 2002).
257 Pakistan Withdraws Reservations, supra note 103.
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isting with people of all faiths, languages and
cultures.258
Similarly, Jack Straw, UK Member of Parliament stated while speak-
ing on behalf of UK Prime Minister Gordon Brown, “[a]ll of us hugely
admire the work of the Ahmadiyya [Muslim] Community here in the
United Kingdom as we do across the world.”259  US Congresswoman
Jackie Speier (D-CA), Congressman Keith Elison (D-MN), Congress-
woman Sheila Jackson (D-TX), and Congressman Tom Petri (R-WI)
have each expressed similar sentiments about the Ahmadiyya Muslim
Community’s moderate and pluralistic platform.260
The next step, beyond simple public endorsement however, is
that nations must proactively protect moderate religious minorities
from violence and harm.  This should not be difficult as the ICCPR
member nations are already committed to promoting equality and
moderation in a unified manner.  In the current Pakistan model, mod-
erate positions are marginalized and disenfranchised while extremist
ideologies continue to flourish unchecked.  For change to occur, the in-
ternational ICCPR member community must jointly protect Pakistan’s
moderate minorities from harm, thereby promoting exactly the oppo-
site scenario.  Such efforts, performed consistently, will send a clear
message to Pakistan, the extremists within Pakistan, and extremists
around the world, that the world is united against extremism.
PART V: CONCLUSION
Amnesty International describes Pakistan’s anti-blasphemy
laws best as “a handy tool to silence debate and dissent.”261  How
ironic when the Nations founder, Muhammad Ali Jinnah, envisioned
“a State in which we could live and breathe as free men.”262  Pakistan
has signed and ratified the ICCPR and even retracted its reservations.
Yet, violence against innocent civilians and religious minorities in Pa-
kistan continues to increase exponentially.  Members of the
258 Prime Minister Harper Attends Opening of Baitun Nur Ahmadiyya Mosque,
PRIME MINISTER OF CANADA (July 5, 2008), http://pm.gc.ca/eng/media.asp?id=2191.
259 Khilafat Centenary Reception at the Queen Elizabeth II Center – Part 3, YOU-
TUBE (Jan. 7, 2009), http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ZGRkKdK037Q&feature=
player_embedded.
260 Press Release, Cision Wire, Ahmadiyya Muslim Community USA (Sept. 13,
2011), http://www.cisionwire.com/ahmadiyya-muslim-community-usa/r/members-
of-congress-and-muslims-unite,c9161465.
261 Amnesty Int’l, Pakistan: Blasphemy Laws Should be Abolished, AI Index ASA
33/023/2001 (Aug. 21, 2001), available at http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/asset/
ASA33/023/2001/en/6bd5700e-d8f5-11dd-ad8c-f3d4445c118e/asa330232001en.
html.
262 Muhammad Ali Jinnah, President, Pak., Address to Civil, Naval, Military and
Air Force Officers of Pakistan Government, Karachi (Oct. 11, 1947).
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Ahmadiyya Muslim Community are completely disenfranchised from
voting.  Anti-blasphemy legislation has only strengthened extremists
and paralyzed moderation, leading to ongoing persecution of Paki-
stan’s minority Christian, Hindu, and Ahmadi Muslim populations.
The longer Pakistan is allowed to dysfunction through violation of in-
ternational human rights regulations, the more detrimental the conse-
quences, and the more difficult it will be to reform Pakistan in the
future.
Therefore, the international ICCPR community must reassert
its focus to recognize Pakistan’s blatant ICCPR violations and hold Pa-
kistan accountable through Article 41 enforcement.  Likewise, the
United States must now again invest in Pakistan to defeat extremism,
just as it invested in Pakistan before to defeat Communism.  In addi-
tion, Pakistan should be assertively encouraged to sign the First Op-
tional Protocol of the ICCPR to afford persecuted minorities their first
opportunity in nearly two decades to be heard, and Ahmadi Muslims
their first opportunity in nearly four decades to exercise their right to
vote.  Finally, the United States and the United Nations must publicly
support and actively protect the adherents of Pakistan’s moderate re-
ligious organizations, thereby promoting national and international
security.  Only with a multi-faceted push to oblige Pakistan’s full and
transparent ICCPR compliance can Jinnah’s Pakistan that, “start[ed]
with this fundamental principle that we are all citizens and equal citi-
zens of one State,” finally become a reality once again.263
263 Jinnah’s Constituent Assembly Address, supra note 10.
